Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
Winter 2012

Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
Christopher R. Drahozal
Samantha Zyontz
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Contracts Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons

Recommended Citation
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration , in 79 Tennessee
Law Review 289 (2012).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/3144

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Jul 28 17:21:49 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
, 79 TENN. L. REV. 289 (2012).
ALWD 7th ed.
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
, 79 Tenn. L. Rev. 289 (2012).
APA 7th ed.
Drahozal, C. R., & Zyontz, S. (2012). Private regulation of consumer arbitration
Tennessee Law Review, 79(2), 289-352.
Chicago 17th ed.
Christopher R. Drahozal; Samantha Zyontz, "Private Regulation of Consumer Arbitration
," Tennessee Law Review 79, no. 2 (Winter 2012): 289-352
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, "Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration " (2012) 79:2 Tenn L Rev 289.
AGLC 4th ed.
Christopher R. Drahozal and Samantha Zyontz, 'Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration ' (2012) 79(2) Tennessee Law Review 289
MLA 9th ed.
Drahozal, Christopher R., and Samantha Zyontz. "Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration ." Tennessee Law Review, vol. 79, no. 2, Winter 2012, pp. 289-352.
HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, 'Private Regulation of Consumer
Arbitration ' (2012) 79 Tenn L Rev 289
Provided by:
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

PRIVATE REGULATION OF CONSUMER
ARBITRATION
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL*

&

SAMANTHA ZYONTZ**

Arbitration providers, such as the American Arbitration Association
("AAA') and JAMS, have promulgated due process protocols to regulate
the fairness of consumer and employment arbitration agreements. A
common criticism of these due process protocols, however, has been that
they lack an enforcement mechanism. While arbitrationproviders state that
they enforce the protocols by refusing to administer cases in which the
arbitrationagreement materiallyfails to comply with the relevantprotocol,
the private nature of arbitraldispute resolution makes it difficult to verify
whetherproviders in fact refuse to administersuch cases.
This Article reports the results of the first empirical study of the AAA's
enforcement of its Consumer Due Process Protocol. We find that the AAA's
review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance appears to be
effective at identifying and responding to those clauses with protocol
violations. Duringthe time periodstudied, the AAA refused to administer a
substantial number of cases (almost 10% of its total consumer caseload)
that involved a protocol violation. Moreover, in response to AAA protocol
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compliance review, over 150 businesses either waived problematic
provisions or revised arbitrationclauses to remove provisions that violated
the Consumer Due Process Protocol.
Ourfindings support the propositionthat private regulation by the AAA
complements existing public regulation of the fairness of consumer
arbitration clauses. Any consideration of the need for future legislative
action should take into account the effectiveness of this private regulation.
That said, we do not assert that private regulation alone-with no public
regulatory backstop, such as judicial oversight-suffices to ensure the
fairness of consumer arbitrationproceedings.Rather, we suggest both ways
that courts andpolicy makers could reinforce the AAA 's enforcement of the
Consumer Due Process Protocoland ways the AAA could improve its own
review process.
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REGULATION OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION
I. INTRODUCTION

The debate over consumer and employment arbitration-more
specifically, the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
consumer and employment contracts-has largely focused on the
appropriate degree of public regulation. Courts play a central role in that
regulation, using various state law contract doctrines' as well as other
theories to police the fairness of arbitration agreements.2 Though the threat
of preemption by the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") has constrained state
legislatures from extensive regulation of consumer and employment
arbitration, 3 Congress has become increasingly active, both by making predispute arbitration agreements unenforceable as to certain types of
contracts 4 or claims 5 and by delegating to the new Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau the authority to regulate arbitration clauses in consumer
financial contracts.6
1. The state law contract doctrine most commonly used to police arbitration
agreements is unconscionability, of course. Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward
Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability,52 BUFF. L. REv. 185, 194-96 (2004).
But courts have also used various other contract law doctrines to police the fairness of
arbitration agreements: lack of assent, e.g., Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 289
(Cal. Ct. App. 1998); material breach and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999); lack of
consideration, e.g., Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1131 (7th
Cir. 1997); and fraud, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 908 (Cal.
1997). Indeed, courts have occasionally found the procedures in some arbitration agreements
to be so one-sided that the process could not fairly be called arbitration and have therefore
refused to enforce the agreement for that reason as well. See, e.g., Cheng-Canindin v.
Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867, 877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
2. See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants' Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 199 (2d Cir. 2011)
(finding a class arbitration waiver in an arbitration clause in a commercial contract
unenforceable because it precluded the claimant from vindicating its statutory rights).
3. See generally Christopher R. Drahozal, FederalArbitration Act Preemption, 79
IND. L.J. 393, 407-20 (2004) (providing overview of FAA preemption analysis).
4. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4) (2006) (making arbitration clause in agreement to
extend consumer credit to military personnel unenforceable); 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006)
(making arbitration clause in motor vehicle franchise contract unenforceable); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1639c(e)(I) (Supp. 2010) (precluding residential mortgage loan contract from including
arbitration clause); see also 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a) (Supp. 2010) (requiring livestock or poultry
contract that includes an arbitration clause to permit a producer or grower to opt out of the
arbitration clause prior to entering the contract).
5. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 26(n) (Supp. 2010); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(e) (Supp. 2010) (making pre-dispute arbitration
agreements unenforceable as to certain whistle-blower claims); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 (Supp. 2010) (restricting
clauses in employment contracts of defense contractors that provide for the use of arbitration
to resolve civil rights or sexual harassment claims).
6. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. Ill-
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However, not all regulation of business behavior comes from public
entities. Private regulation also can constrain business practices. In the
arbitration arena, private regulation takes the form of due process protocols
setting out minimum standards of procedural fairness.8 As Paul Verkuil has
stated:
The Consumer Due Process Protocol, for example, calls for a
"fundamentally fair process" in arbitration that stipulates adequate notice,
an opportunity to be heard, and an independent decision maker. These
procedural ingredients are comparable to those that would be provided
pursuant to the informal due process requirements of the Constitution or
under the fair procedure
requirements of private associations like the
9
NCAA or universities.

The leading arbitration providers, the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") and JAMS (formerly the Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Service), have both promulgated due process protocols governing consumer
and employment arbitrations.1" The AAA has also promulgated protocols
governing health care and debt collection arbitrations."
A common criticism of these due process protocols has been that they
lack a mechanism for ensuring compliance with their provisions.' 2 While
the protocols set out minimum standards of procedural fairness, they do not
specify how to enforce those standards. Arbitration providers like the AAA
and JAMS state that they will refuse to administer a case when the
13
arbitration clause materially fails to comply with the relevant protocol.

203, § 1028, 124 Stat. 1376 (Supp. 2010) (requiring the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau to study the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial services
contracts and authorizing the CFPB to regulate consistently with the findings of the study).
7. See Tim Btithe, PrivateRegulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review, 12 Bus.
& POL. (SPECIAL ISSUE), no. 3, at 1, 15-20 (2010) (surveying literature on compliance with
private regulation). For a normative analysis of private versus public regulation of consumer
and employment arbitration, see Christopher R. Drahozal & Peter B. Rutledge, Contract and
Procedure,94 MARQ. L. REv. 1103, 1119-37 (2011).
8. Paul R. Verkuil, PrivatizingDue Process,57 ADMIN. L. REv. 963,985 (2005).
9. Id. (footnotes omitted).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 53-75.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
12. Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due Process Protocols, 19 OHIo ST. J. ON
DisP. RESOL. 369, 372 (2004) ("The lack of [monitoring and enforcement] provisions makes
it impossible to determine if the due process protocols are in fact being followed by
individual arbitrators and arbitration service providers in actual cases."); Jean R. Stemlight,
Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 174
(Edward Brunet et al. eds. 2006) ("Because the protocols are simply policies adopted by
arbitration providers, there is no clear enforcement mechanism.").
13. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms
Do (andDo Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REv. 655, 662 (2007).
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However, the private nature of arbitral dispute resolution makes it difficult
to verify whether providers in fact refuse to administer such cases.
In particular, some critics have alleged that the AAA fails to ensure
compliance with the protocols. For example, Laura MacCleery, Director of
Public Citizen's Congress Watch Division, testified before Congress that
"[w]hile AAA touts its internal protocols, it does not pledge to always
follow them.", 14 Likewise, the plaintiffs in Ting v. AT&T alleged in their
complaint in California federal court that "despite its representations to the
contrary, AAA regularly administers arbitrations or otherwise endorses the
arbitration clauses that do not comply
validity of mandatory pre-dispute
5
with its Due Process Protocol."1
Evaluating these criticisms requires empirical evidence on the AAA's
review of arbitration clauses for compliance with the Due Process Protocol.
However, direct evidence on the nature and extent of protocol compliance
review by the AAA has previously been unavailable. 16 As Mark
14. HearingBefore the Comm'l and Admin. Law Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 110th Cong., No. 110-163 (2007), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/
hearings/hear_102507.html (testimony of Laura MacCleery) (citing Declaration of Robert E.
Meade, Senior Vice President, American Arbitration Association in Stahle v. Blue Cross of
Cal., (Cal. Super. Ct. 2000)) ("[Health Care Due Process Protocol] consists of recommended
procedures and compliance with the procedures is voluntary.").
15. Class Action Complaint at para. 59, Ting v. AT&T (Cal. Super. Ct. July 31, 2001)
(No. C01-2969BZ), available at http://www.consumer-action.org/press/articles/ting_
consumer-actionsuesatamptover-bindingarbitrationclause/. Some of these criticisms
are misdirected, however. For example, Public Citizen cites the inclusion of remedy
limitations in many franchise agreements as evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Consumer
Due Process Protocol. Taylor Lincoln & David Arkush, PUBLIC CITIZEN, The Arbitration
Debate Trap: How Opponents of Corporate Accountability Distort the Debate on
Arbitration 33 (2008) [hereinafter PUBLIC CITIZEN], available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ArbitrationDebateTrap(Final).pdf. But the Consumer Protocol does not apply to
franchise agreements, so the comparison misses the mark.
16. For an exception focusing on arbitration costs in employment arbitration, see
Alexander J. S. Colvin, An EmpiricalStudy of Employment Arbitration: Case Outcomes and
Processes, 8 J.EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 9 (2011) ("Among these cases, the employer paid
all arbitration fees 97 percent of the time, indicating that the employer-pays rule is generally
being enforced in AAA employment arbitration cases."). See also Alexander J.S. Colvin,
EmpiricalResearch on Employment Arbitration. Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11
EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 405, 424 (2007) ("In 96.6 percent of the cases in this sample the
employer paid 100 percent of the arbitrator fees."); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Employment
Arbitration:EmpiricalFindings and Research Needs, J. DIsP. RESOL., Aug.-Oct. 2009, at 6,
7 (discussing 2007 Colvin study and implications for protocol compliance).
There is indirect evidence of compliance with the Employment Due Process
Protocol, in the form of a study by Lisa Bingham and Shimon Sarraf finding that employee
win-rates in AAA employment arbitration increased after adoption of the Protocol. Lisa B.
Bingham & Shimon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After the Due Process
Protocolfor Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment:
Preliminary Evidence That Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATE DISPUTE
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Weidemaier has stated: "With respect to the AAA, for example, we do not
know whether it routinely conducts an adequate, independent review of the
governing agreement before accepting a case for arbitration. ' ' 7 Without
of occasional
systematic empirical study, the only evidence consists
8
anecdotal reports of alleged violations of the protocols.'
This Article reports the results of the first empirical study of the AAA's
enforcement of its Consumer Due Process Protocol, using a sample of 301
AAA consumer arbitrations that resulted in an award between April and
December 2007. Our main findings are as follows:
*

*

*

*

In the sample of AAA consumer arbitrations we reviewed, the
majority of consumer arbitration clauses (229 of 299, or 76.6%)
fully complied with the Consumer Due Process Protocol as applied
by the AAA.
The AAA's review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance
appears to be effective at identifying and responding to those
clauses with protocol violations. In 266 out of 271 cases (98.2%),
either the arbitration clause complied with the Due Process
Protocol or the AAA properly identified and responded to the
clause's non-compliance.
The AAA in the time period studied refused to administer at least
85 consumer cases, and likely at least 129 consumer cases (or 9.4%
of its total consumer caseload), because the business failed to
comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol.
In response to AAA protocol compliance review, over 150
businesses have either waived problematic provisions or revised
arbitration clauses to remove provisions that violated the Consumer
Due Process Protocol.

Our findings support the proposition that private regulation by the AAA
complements existing public regulation of the fairness of consumer
RESOLUTION IN TIE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD

303, 321 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds., 2004).
17. W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation Critique, 49 ARIZ. L.
REv. 69, 93 n.138 (2007); see also id. at 107 (stating that data are lacking on "how
consistently the AAA or other providers enforce their due process protocols" and that this "is
an area worthy of further study"); Weidemaier, supranote 13, at 659 ("Another possibility is
that the company knows that JAMS and AAA often do not enforce their rules. This cannot
be ruled out, in part because providers are reluctant to provide the data needed to evaluate
this possibility. There have been allegations that actual practices sometimes conflict with
providers' public stances. Providers, however, are under no small amount of scrutiny, and I
am not aware of supported allegations of under- or non-enforcement of these providers' due
process rules.").
18. See Paul Bland, AAA Breaks Its Promise Not To HearPre-DisputeArbitrationsin
Health Care Cases, CL&P BLoG (Feb. 22, 2007), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2007/02
/aaa breaks its_.html.
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR
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arbitration clauses. Any consideration of the need for future legislative
action should take into account the effectiveness of such private regulation.
That said, we are not asserting that private regulation alone-with no public
regulatory backstop, such as judicial oversight-suffices to ensure the
fairness of consumer arbitration proceedings. Rather, we suggest both ways
that courts and policy makers could reinforce the AAA's enforcement of
the Consumer Due Process Protocol and ways the AAA could improve its
own review process.
Part II of this Article discusses the incentives of arbitration providers to
promote the fairness of consumer arbitration proceedings. Part III provides
an overview of the history and content of the due process protocols. Part IV
describes in detail the AAA's process for enforcing the Consumer Due
Process Protocol. Part V details our empirical methodology, and Part VI
presents our empirical results.
II. ARBITRATION PROVIDERS AND ARBITRAL FAIRNESS
The axiom that "arbitration is a matter of contract' '9 is generally
directed toward the contract between the parties to the arbitration
proceeding-that is, toward the parties' arbitration agreement.20 Because
arbitration is a matter of contract, "nothing in the [FAA] authorizes a court
to compel arbitration of any issues, or by any parties, that are not already
covered in the agreement."' Moreover, "[j]ust as [the parties] may limit by
contract the issues which they will arbitrate, so too may they specify
by
22
contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.",
But the parties' arbitration agreement is not the only contract that
governs the arbitration process. When the parties choose an arbitrator, they
are agreeing to have that person resolve their dispute; the agreement
of the
23
arbitrator to serve is an essential part of the arbitration process. The same
19. See, e.g., Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) ("The
FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract."); First
Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (stating that "arbitration is simply
a matter of contract").
20. Of course, not all aspects of arbitration law are derived from a contractual model,
which should not be surprising, as arbitration law is governed by federal and state statutes
enacted to change the common law of contracts. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rhetoric
Versus Reality in Arbitration Jurisprudence:How the Supreme Court Flaunts and Flunks
Contracts (and Why Contracts Teachers Need Not Teach the Cases), 61 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2011).
21. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 289 (2002); see also Stolt-Nielsen,
S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774 (2010) ("We think it is also clear
from our precedents and the contractual nature of arbitration that parties may specify with
whom they choose to arbitrate their disputes.").
22. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989) (citation omitted).
23. See Peter B. Rutledge, Toward a ContractualApproachfor ArbitralImmunity, 39
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is true when the parties choose an "arbitration provider" to provide
administrative services that facilitate the arbitration process.24 As described
by Ed Brunet:
Organizations of arbitration providers such as the AAA and the Judicial
Arbitration and Mediation Service, Inc. are full-service firms that not only
supply arbitrators but also help the disputants in the many procedural
issues that can arise during an arbitration. In return for a fee, the provider
organizations essentially process an arbitrated dispute. They open a file,
help the parties mutually select an arbitrator or panel, collect and disburse
organizational and arbitrator fees, file motion requests, build a panel of
expert arbitrators, publish procedural rules for arbitrations, and answer
procedural questions to avoid ex parte contact between disputants and
arbitrators.25
Of course, parties need not use an arbitration provider to provide these
administrative services. 26 The arbitrator or arbitrators might handle the
administrative duties, or the parties might set up an administrative process
that is separate from any arbitration provider.2 ? That said, most contracts
with arbitration clauses, at least those for which data are available, specify
an arbitration provider in the clause.28
The leading domestic arbitration providers are the AAA and JAMS.29
The list of international arbitration providers is much longer and includes
the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (the international arm of the
GA. L. REv.

151, 191-99 (2004) (arguing for a contract-based approach to arbitral
immunity).
24. Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 663; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

cmt. aa to § 1-1 (2012) (Council Draft No. 3)

("arbitral institution"); Eric J. Mogilnicki & Kirk D. Jensen, Arbitration and
Unconscionability,19 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 761, 781 (2003) ("arbitration administrators").
25. Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of
Arbitration,74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 52-53 (1999).
26. Such arbitrations are referred to variously as "non-administered" or "ad hoc." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) U.S. LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION reporters'

note to cmt. c, § 1-1 (2012) (Council Draft No. 3) (using "ad hoc"); INT'L INST. FOR
CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION (CPR), RULES FOR NON-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION

(EFFECTIVE Nov. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALL
CPRArticles/tabid/265/JD/600/2007-CPR-Rules-for-Non-Administered-Arbitration.aspx
(using "non-administered").
27. However, when a business does not choose a reputable arbitration provider, a court
might justifiably look more skeptically on the enforceability of such a clause. See infra text
accompanying notes 239-40.
28. See, e.g., Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 1126 tbl.3.
29. The National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") likely would have been on this list as
well, because of the size of its consumer arbitration caseload, before July 2009, when it
stopped administering new consumer arbitration cases in settlement of a consumer fraud suit
brought by the Minnesota Attorney General. See infra note 53.
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AAA), the Court of International Arbitration of the International Chamber
of Commerce, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and
others.3 ° Some arbitration providers, such as the AAA, are organized as notfor-profit entities; others, such as JAMS, are for-profit businesses. 3 1 Some
providers tend to focus on a particular type of dispute, while others
provide arbitration services for a wide range of industries. The AAA, for
example, provides commercial arbitration rules, employment arbitration
rules, and consumer arbitration rules, along with a wide array of industryspecific arbitration rules.33
Like other providers of services, arbitration providers compete with
each other to attract business. 34 This competition can take a variety of
forms. Arbitration providers certainly compete on price.35 They also
compete by updating their arbitration rules-which serve as standard form
terms that parties can incorporate by reference into their contract-to make
them more attuned to their customers' needs.36 Arbitration providers
30. See HONG KONG INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CENTRE, CASE STATISTICS-201 0,
http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/en/hkiac-statistics/case-statistics (last visited Mar. 16, 2012)
(listing case filing statistics reported by various international arbitration institutions).
31. Joseph M. Matthews, Consumer Arbitration:Is It Working Now and Will It Work
in the Future?,FLA. BAR J., Apr. 2005, at 22, 26-27.
32. See, e.g., AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASs'N ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION SERV.,
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR ARBITRATION, at A-5 (revised July 2010), available at
http://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/ADR/Code%20of/*20Ethic%20and%2ORules%2
0ofo20Proceduresl/Arbitration%2ORules%20and%20Procedures%20-%20Revised%20
July/o20201 0.pdf.
33. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, MAJOR ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION RULES AND
ADR PROGRAMS, http://www.adr.org/commercial arbitration (last visited Apr. 22, 2011)
(listing arbitration rules for construction, energy, financial services, health care, insurance,
real estate, accounting, intellectual property, internet, securities, sports, and wireless
disputes).
34. See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 25, at 52 ("At present, arbitration services are
supplied in a very competitive market.... Rivalry is intense among individual arbitrators
and firms who provide arbitration services."); Rutledge, supra note 23, at 164 ("These
markets for dispute resolution services (both domestic and international) are marked by
fierce competition among suppliers (except in rare cases of mandatory tribunals, such as the
Iran Claims Tribunal). Suppliers of dispute resolution services (i.e., arbitral institutions)
compete with courts and with each other to encourage parties to resolve their disputes by
means of their services."); Jean R. Stemlight, Creeping MandatoryArbitration:Is It Just?,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1650 (2005) ("Arbitration organizations, such as the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) and the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), are now
competing to provide arbitration services for particular companies that require their
consumers to arbitrate future disputes.").
35. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and

InternationalCommercialArbitration,33

VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 100 (2000).

36. Id. at 101; Larry Smith & Lori Tripoli, PrivatizedInternationalDispute Settlement
... Competing Arbitration Centers Mean User-Friendly Resolutions Worldwide, INSIDE
LIG., May 1998, at 1, 2 ("Clearly the motive for [ICC rules revisions] was competitive.").
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compete by providing new and different forms of dispute resolution
services as well.3 7
This competition among providers has been criticized as giving the
providers an incentive to structure the arbitration process to favor
businesses, which are more likely than consumers and employees to be
repeat players in arbitration.38 For example, the original version of the
proposed Arbitration Fairness Act set out as one of its legislative findings
that "[p]rivate arbitration companies are sometimes under great pressure to
devise systems that favor the corporate repeat players who decide whether
those companies will receive their lucrative business. 39 Public Citizen has
asserted that arbitration providers "have the strongest of incentives to favor
business: Their very existence depends on whether businesses choose
them." 40 As a result, according to Public Citizen, "binding mandatory
arbitration creates market competition to favor business." 41 This possibility
has been described as a "race to the bottom" in consumer and employment
arbitration.42
On the other hand, the competitive pressures faced by arbitration
providers are not unconstrained. As previously noted, courts regulate the
arbitration process by refusing
to enforce arbitration agreements that they
43
find to be too unfair. An arbitration provider that caters solely to
businesses by providing unfair arbitration procedures risks having
arbitration agreements specifying the provider's use, or awards made under
its auspices, set aside." Such court oversight can give arbitration providers
37. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, OPTIONAL RULES FOR EMERGENCY MEASURES
OF PROTECTION (amended and effective June 1, 2009), available at http://adr.org/
sp.asp?id=22440.
38. It may be that lawyers who represent employees or consumers are repeat players
even if individual employees or consumers are not. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair"
ArbitrationClauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 751.
39. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, l11th Cong., § 2(4) (2009). That
finding no longer appears in the current version of the Bill. See Arbitration Fairness Act of
2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong., § 2 (2011).
40. PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 15, at 25.
41. Id.
42. Jean R. Stemlight, Is the US. Out on a Limb? Comparing the US. Approach to
Mandatory Consumer and Employment Arbitration to that of the Rest of the World, 56 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 831, 842-43 (2002) ("Moreover, not all arbitrators and arbitral organizations
have signed on to the Due Process Protocols, so there is some risk that arbitrators will
engage in a race to the bottom in order to secure large numbers of arbitration contracts.");
Stemlight, supra note 12, at 174 ("[M]any have raised concerns that if major and reputable
arbitration providers all choose to adopt fairness protocols, other less reputable providers
may enter the field, offering companies an alternative that is beneficial to the company, but
not its opponents. That is, the Protocols could prompt a classic 'race to the bottom."').
43. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
44. See, e.g., FIA Card Servs., N.A. v. Escobar, No. 18132/2009, 2010 N.Y. Misc.
LEXIS 3729, at *2 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. May 21, 2010) ("Respondent has submitted evidence,
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an incentive to provide for fair arbitration procedures. 45 As Mark
Weidemaier has explained:
[P]roviders may also sell legitimacy. Arbitration clauses are often
challenged by parties who would prefer to litigate their disputes in court,
and the designation of a recognized provider may help immunize the
arbitration agreement from challenge ....

One way a provider can confer

legitimacy is to publicly adopt and enforce due process or "fairness"
rules.46
Thus, one reason an arbitration provider might adopt a due process protocol
would be to protect its reputation as a provider of a fair dispute resolution
process and hence to enhance the enforceability of arbitration agreements
and awards in court. Indeed, the benefits of developing a reputation for
fairness are not limited to the provider's credibility with courts, but could
extend to the provider's acceptability to parties more generally. This
incentive would be particularly strong for a provider that also provides
administrative services for business-against-business arbitrations.
An arbitration provider might adopt a due process protocol for other
reasons as well. 47 Arbitration providers might adopt a due process protocol
to reduce the risk of additional public regulation-that is, to reduce the
likelihood that Congress would regulate consumer arbitration more
stringently or preclude altogether the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in consumer and employment contracts.4 8 A provider might adopt a
unrebutted by petitioner, that NAF is not a neutral party.... [S]uch [institutional] bias itself,
without the need to prove bias by individual arbitrators, at the very least strongly militates in
favor of vacating an award."). But see Sier v. Chase Bank, USA, No. 3:08-CV-130, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18309, at *10-*ll (N.D. W. Va. Feb. 25, 2011) (In refusing to vacate
award on the basis of allegations of "general bias," the court stated it was "unable
to vacate an arbitration award simply because a few news articles and a Minnesota consent
judgment question the partiality of the association to which the subject arbitrator belongs.").
45. Drahozal, supra note 38, at 769 ("[A]rbitration institutions have a strong incentive
to enhance the fairness of the process in order to assure users that their arbitration awards
will be enforceable."); Peter B. Rutledge, Common Ground in the Arbitration Debate, 1
Y.B. ON ARn. & MEDIATION 1, 28 (2009) ("For many organizations, such as the American
Arbitration Association, their reputation for neutrality and independence may be far more
important: the enforceability of the award is the 'bond' on which parties depend when they
opt for its services. If courts begin to vacate their awards, then the institution's 'bond'
effectively fails, and parties would cease using those services.").
46. Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 661-62 (footnotes omitted).
47. Note that these explanations are not mutually exclusive; more than one might
apply.
48. ERIN A. O'HARA & LARRY E. RIBsTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 143 (2009) ("These
moves [promulgating the Consumer Due Process Protocol and offering reduced-cost
consumer arbitration] presumably represent a compromise between consumer groups and
companies brokered by the AAA to preserve consumer arbitration against the risk that
consumer groups will be able to persuade legislators to enact more stringent protections at
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due process protocol because of a demand for fair arbitration procedures by
businesses that seek to enhance their own reputations for dealing fairly with
their customers.49 Conversely, a provider might adopt a due process
protocol because of a demand for fair arbitration procedures by consumers
or employees (or, more likely, their lawyers).50 More cynically, an
arbitration provider might adopt a due process protocol to give the
appearance of fairness that does not really exist. Such a characterization
seems implicit in critics' suggestions that arbitration providers might not be
enforcing the protocols they have adopted.5 1 More idealistically, an
arbitration provider might adopt a due process protocol because its
management believes that ensuring fairness is the right thing to do.52
Fully distinguishing among these various reasons is impossible, at least
given the evidence we have available. Our goal instead is more modest.
This Article examines (1) how effectively the AAA, the first provider to
adopt a due process protocol, reviews consumer arbitration clauses for
protocol compliance; (2) whether it refuses to administer cases that do not
comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol; and (3) whether it
requires businesses to make changes in their dispute resolution clauses for
future cases (and the extent to which businesses do so). If the AAA is
reasonably effective at carrying out these enforcement practices, then at the
very least we can have confidence that there is substance to the AAA's
adoption of the Consumer Due Process Protocol-that it does more than
merely provide the appearance of fairness.
III. OVERVIEW OF ARBITRATION DUE PROCESS PROTOCOLS
The major arbitration providers each have their own due process
protocols.53 The AAA adheres to the Employment Due Process Protocol,
the state or federal level."); Drahozal, supra note 38, at 769 ("[U]nfaimess in arbitration
raises the possibility of increased government regulation of the arbitration process. Such
regulation could take a variety of forms, but many would pose a serious threat to the
business of arbitration institutions. As often happens, the threat of government regulation
can spur the industry to self-regulate in an attempt to head off restrictive legislation.").
49. Drahozal, supra note 38, at 767-69.
50. See infra note 69.
51. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
52. Arbitration providers that are not-for-profit entities might be less subject to market
pressures than for-profit entities, and so more likely to follow pro-consumer business
strategies. See Ryan Bubb & Alex Kaufman, Consumer Biases and Firm Ownership3 (work
in progress), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 945852.
53. In addition, the National Arbitration Forum ("NAF") had issued an Arbitration
Bill of Rights applicable to consumer arbitrations it administered. NAT'L ARBITRATION
FORUM, ARBITRATION BILL OF RIGHTS (2007), available at www.adrforum.com/users/naf/
resources/ArbitrationBillOfRights3.pdf. In July 2009, however, the NAF agreed to
discontinue administering new consumer arbitrations as part of its settlement of a consumer
fraud action brought by the Minnesota Attorney General. Consent Judgment, at para. 3,
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the Consumer Due Process Protocol, the Health Care Due Process Protocol,
and the Consumer Debt Collection Due Process Protocol.54 JAMS has set
out Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness for both consumer
arbitration and employment arbitration.5
A. History of the Protocols
The origins of due process protocols have been described in detail by
other authors. 56 This Section summarizes those origins briefly, focusing on
the Employment Due Process Protocol and the Consumer Due Process
Protocol and their implementation by the AAA.
Due process protocols trace back to the work of the "Dunlop
Commission," a body established in 1993 to "investigate the current state of

Minnesota v. National Arbitration Forum, Inc., No. 27-CV-09-18550 (Minn. Dist. Ct. July
17, 2009), available at http://pubcit.typepad.com/files/nafconsentdecree.pdf. Because the
NAF no longer administers consumer arbitrations, we have omitted any discussion of its
Arbitration Bill of Rights in this section. Nevertheless, the NAF might illustrate (assuming
that the allegations in the Minnesota Attorney General's complaint were accurate) that
merely promulgating a due process protocol does not itself protect consumers.
54.

NAT'L

CONSUMER

DISPUTES ADvISORY

COMM.,

CONSUMER

DUE PROCESS

PROTOCOL (Apr. 17, 1998), availableat http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_
005014 [hereinafter CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]; see also COMM'N ON HEALTH

CARE DISPUTE RESOLUTION, HEALTH CARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL (July 27, 1998),
available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_003859 [hereinafter HEALTH
CARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]; NAT'L TASK FORCE ON THE ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER
DEBT COLLECTION DISPUTES, CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL-

STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (Oct. 2010), availableat http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?
nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_003865&revision=latestreleased [hereinafter CONSUMER DEBT
COLLECTION DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]; TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN EMPLOYMENT, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY

DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (May 9, 1995), available at
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/lee/documents/document/mdaw/mdaz/-ed
isp/adrstg_004368.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL]. Professor
Drahozal was a member of the Task Force that prepared the Consumer Debt Collection Due
Process Protocol.
55. JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-DISPUTE
CLAUSES: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (Jan. 1, 2007), available at http://
www.jamsadr.com/rules-consumer-minimum-standards/
[hereinafter JAMS CONSUMER
MINIMUM STANDARDS]; JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION: MINIMUM
STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS (revised Feb. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/employment-minimum-standards/ [hereinafter JAMS EMPLOYMENT
MINIMUM STANDARDS].

56. In particular, see Harding, supra note 12, at 373-416. For a personal account of
the origins of the Employment Due Process Protocol, see Arnold M. Zack, The Due Process
Protocol: Getting There and Getting Over It, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 257, 257-59
(2007).
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worker-management relations in the United States. 57 Among the issues the
Commission considered was whether to enhance the ability of the parties
themselves to resolve workplace disputes rather than relying on the courts
and regulators.58 Accordingly, the Commission examined the use of
employment arbitration, finding that while some employers adopted
"serious and fair" arbitration programs, 59 others established programs that
did not meet accepted standards of fairness.6 °
Thereafter, the Chair of the Commission, John T. Dunlop, requested
Arnold M. Zack, president of the National Academy of Arbitrators, to
develop a list of private due process standards that would "extend the
negotiated due process protections of union management arbitration to this
expanding non-union setting.",61 Zack became co-chair of the Task Force on
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, which drafted the
Employment Due Process Protocol.62 Although the members of the Task
Force included representatives from an array of interest groups involved in
employee-employer relations, 63 the members made clear that "the protocol
reflect[ed] their personal views and should not be construed as representing
the policy of the designating organizations." 64 The Task Force issued the
Employment Protocol in May 1995.65 Zack summarized the Task Force's
view of its work:
All the Task Force members will acknowledge that the Protocol does not
contain all the protections and assurances that each of us as individuals
would have liked to include, but the achievement of agreement on the
components of the document did mark a substantial step forward in
providing due process protections
in procedures where many such
66
protections had been lacking.

57.

COMMISSION ON

FINDING REPORT

58. Id.
59. THE DUNLOP
FINAL REPORT

THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS,

FACT-

xi (1994).
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS,

51 (1995).

60. Id. at 73.

61. Zack, supra note 56, at 258.
62. EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54.
63. The Task Force included representatives of the AAA, several committees of the
American Bar Association, the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Society of
Professionals in Dispute Resolution, the National Employment Lawyers Association,
Federal Mediation & Conciliation, and the Workplace Rights Project of the American Civil
Liberties Union. Id.
64. Id.
65.

Id.

66. Zack, supra note 56, at 260. For example, the Task Force members agreed to
disagree on whether pre-dispute arbitration clauses should be enforceable in employment
contracts.

2012]

REGULATION OF CONSUMER ARBITRATION

In July 1995, the AAA established a pilot program in California to
administer arbitrations using new rules incorporating the Employment Due
Process Protocol.67 Based on its experience in California and drawing on a
national Employment Conclave it sponsored in September 1995,68 the AAA
promulgated new Employment Arbitration Rules (effective June 1996)
reflecting the principles of the Employment Protocol. 69 The AAA later
announced that it would refuse to administer employment arbitrations if the
plan failed materially to comply with the Protocol. It also established a
process by which employers could obtain advance review of their dispute
resolution programs for protocol compliance.70
The Employment Due Process Protocol in turn served as the "primary
model" for the Consumer Due Process Protocol. 7 ' In 1997, the AAA
established the National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, which,
like the Employment Task Force, consisted of an array of individuals from
interested groups. 72 In May 1998, the Committee issued the Consumer Due
Process Protocol.73 Thomas J. Stipanowich, the Academic Reporter for the
Protocol, explained that although the AAA established the Advisory
67.

AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN ARBITRATION

ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 12 (Jan. 2003) [hereinafter

AAA, FAIR PLAY].
68. Zack, supra note 56, at 260-61 ("The critical first step in the effort toward
recognition of the validity of the proposals inherent in the Protocol was the decision of
William Slate, President of AAA, to convene a Conclave on Employment Arbitration in
Washington, D.C., on September 22-23, 1995.").
69. AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 13. JAMS likewise adopted the Employment
Protocol. JAMS/Endispute Issues Minimum Standards for Employment Arbitration, 6
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 50, 50 (1995).

Some have suggested that another factor playing a role in both providers' adoption
of the Employment Due Process Protocol was a threatened boycott by the National
Employment Lawyers Association. E.g., Harding, supra note 12, at 403 n.193; Richard C.
Reuben, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses Under Fire, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 58, 58-59
("[The Employment Protocol] largely languished until NELA issued an ultimatum to AAA
and JAMS."); see NationalEmployment Lawyers Association Will Boycott ADR Providers,6
WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 240, 240 (1995); JAMS/Endispute Clarifies Position on
MandatoryEmployment Arbitration, 7 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 512, 512 (1996).

70. AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 13; see infra text accompanying notes 103-09.
71. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
831, 907 (2001).
72. The Task Force included representatives of the AAA, the Federal Trade
Commission, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, the American Association of Retired Persons,
Consumer Action, Consumers Union, the American Council on Consumer Interests, the
National Association of Consumer Agency Administrators, the National Association of
Attorneys General, Duke University, two lawyers in private practice who formerly were
attorneys for large corporations, as well as academics and a retired judge. NAT'L CONSUMER
DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., Introduction: Genesis of the Advisory Committee, in
CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supranote 54, at 46.

73.

Id.; see infra Part IV.B.
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Committee, the AAA's "representatives did not play an active role in the
Committee's deliberations or drafting process. 74 The AAA thereafter
incorporated the principles of the Consumer Protocol into its Consumer
Arbitration Rules and announced, as it had with the Employment Protocol,
75
that it would refuse to administer cases that materially failed to comply.
Shortly after the issuance of the Consumer Due Process Protocol, the
Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution issued a Health Care Due
Process Protocol. 76 As discussed below, the Health Care Due Process
Protocol differs from the Employment and Consumer Protocols because it
requires a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate health care disputes involving
patients.77 The AAA likewise has announced that it will follow the Health
Care Protocol and refuse to administer cases arising out of pre-dispute
arbitration agreements within its scope.78 Most recently, the AAA
developed a Consumer Debt Collection Due Process Protocol,
supplementing the Consumer Due Process Protocol with additional
protections to address issues that are particularly problematic in consumer
debt collection cases.79

74. Stipanowich, supra note 71, at 896 n.383.
75. AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 14. The protocols have influenced the
arbitration of consumer and employee disputes in other ways as well. Businesses have
incorporated the provisions of the Protocols into their arbitration clauses. E.g., AT&T,
BellSouth Service Agreement for Residential Services in Alabama, http://cpr.bellsouth.
com/pdf/al/alressa.pdf (2006) ("[I]n the event that the AAA determines that any provision
of this Agreement does not comply with applicable standards stated in the AAA's Consumer
Due Process Protocol, the standards of the protocol shall control."); FrST VICTORIA, TIBThe Independent Bankersbank Visa Gift Card Terms and Conditions (Associate Program),
available at https://www.firstvictoria.com/fileslISAGiftCardTerms.pdf ("All disputes
between you and the Bank in connection with your Gift Card and these Terms and
Conditions will be resolved by BINDING ARBITRATION in accordance with the
Consumer Due Process Protocol ....
").Courts have relied on the protocols in evaluating the
fairness of an arbitration clause. See Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Process
Protocol at Ten: Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 165, 178-84 (2005) (discussing cases). Proposed federal legislation
(not the Arbitration Fairness Act) has been modeled on the protocols. See Fair Arbitration
Act, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007).
76. The Commission was comprised of representatives of the AAA, ABA, and the
American Medical Association. HEALTH CARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, at 34.
77. Id. princ. 3.
78. See infra text accompanying note 84.
79. CONSUMER DEBT COLLECTION DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, at 7-11.
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B. Content of the Protocols

The due process protocols of the leading arbitration providers are
broadly consistent in content. This Section describes key features the
protocols have in common and highlights some important differences.
First, several of the protocols set out an overarching principle of
"fundamental fairness." 80 The protocols do not make clear whether
"fundamental fairness" is an independent requirement that must be satisfied
or whether complying with the other requirements of the protocols
constitutes fundamental fairness. The Commentary to the Consumer Due
Process Protocol suggests the latter, explaining that the other principles in
the Protocol "identify specific minimum due process standards which
embody the concept of fundamental fairness." 8 Nonetheless, the
requirement of fundamental fairness might be construed to have
independent force as a constraint on procedures in consumer arbitrations.82
Second, several of the protocols address the contract formation process.
The Consumer Due Process Protocol and the JAMS Minimum Standards
for consumer arbitrations require businesses to provide consumers with
"full and accurate information" on the arbitration program. 83 As noted
above, the Health Care Due Process Protocol's prohibition against
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements is one important
difference between it and the other due process protocols.8 4 By comparison,
the drafters of the Employment Due Process Protocol, like the drafters of
the Consumer Due Process Protocol, agreed to disagree on whether predispute arbitration clauses should be enforceable. 5 Consequently, neither
the Employment Due Process Protocol nor the Consumer Due Process
Protocol addresses the enforceability of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements-neither Protocol sets out as a prerequisite for a fair process
that the arbitration agreement be entered after a dispute arises. The same is
true for the JAMS Minimum Standards.86
Third, the Consumer Due Process Protocol and the JAMS Minimum
Standards of Procedural Fairness for consumer arbitrations permit claimants
80.

E.g., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 1.

81.
82.

Id. reporter's cmts. to princ. 1.
And, in fact, the AAA does so in examining arbitration clauses for protocol

compliance. See infra text accompanying note 128.

83. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princs.
CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55.
84. HEALTH CARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 3.

2, 11; JAMS

85. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, Scope ("As was the case with
the task force which developed the Employment Due Process Protocol, opinions regarding
the appropriateness of binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer contracts
were never fully reconciled.").
86. JAMS EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55, Introduction ("JAMS
does not take a position on the enforceability of condition-of-employment arbitration
clauses ... ").
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to bring claims in small claims court rather than arbitration, even if the
claims are subject to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.87 Neither the
Employment Due Process Protocol nor the JAMS Minimum Standards for
employment arbitrations contains opt-outs for small claims court,88 possibly
due to the sorts of claims that typically arise out of the employment
relationship.
The JAMS Minimum Standards (for both consumer arbitrations and
employment arbitrations) contain an additional limitation on the scope of
arbitration agreements, ' 8providing that arbitration agreements must be
"reciprocally binding." 1 Under the JAMS Minimum Standards, an
arbitration clause is "reciprocally binding" when a business is bound to
or employee. 90 None of the
arbitrate to the same extent as the consumer
91
requirement.
similar
a
has
other protocols
Fourth, the bulk of protocol provisions address procedural aspects of
arbitration. Here, the requirements of the protocols are broadly similar. The
protocols typically require (1) independent and impartial arbitrators; (2)
reasonable arbitration costs; (3) a reasonably convenient hearing location;
(4) reasonable time limits for the proceeding; (5)the right to representation;
(6) adequate discovery; and (7) a fair hearing. 92 Not all of the provisions of
the protocols on these topics are identical, but they are broadly consistent.
Fifth, all of the protocols address the remedies available in arbitration
and the arbitration award itself. Every protocol requires that all remedies
available in court also be available in arbitration. 93 In addition, the protocols
typically require the arbitrator to follow the law in making a decision
94 and to
issue a written award, providing reasons for the award on request.

87. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 5; JAMS CONSUMER
MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55, Standard I(B).
88. EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54; JAMS EMPLOYMENT
MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55.
89. JAMS CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55, Standard I(A); JAMS
EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55, Standard 7 ("Both the employer and the
employee must have the same obligation (either to arbitrate or go to court) with respect to
the same kinds of claims.").
90. JAMS CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55, Standard I(A) (defining
clause as "reciprocally binding" when a consumer or employee is "required to
arbitration
an
arbitrate his or her claims or all claims of a certain type, the company is so bound" as well).
91. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54; EMPLOYMENT DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL, supra note 54. Courts likewise are split on whether non-mutual arbitration
clauses are enforceable. Christopher R. Drahozal, Non-Mutual Arbitration Clauses, 27 J.
CORP. L. 537, 542 (2002).
92. See, e.g., CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princs. 3, 6-9, 1213.
93. See, e.g., id.
94. See, e.g., id.
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IV. AAA ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL

This Part discusses in detail the AAA's review of consumer arbitration
clauses for compliance with the Consumer Due Process Protocol, beginning
with the review process and then addressing the substance of the AAA's
review. 95 For a case to be treated as a "consumer" case by the AAA, it must
meet the following requirements: (1) it must arise out of "an agreement
between a consumer and a business where the business has a standardized,
systematic application of arbitration clauses with customers"; 96 (2) "the
terms and conditions of the purchase of standardized, consumable goods or
services [must be] non-negotiable or primarily non-negotiable in most or all
of its terms, conditions, features, or choices"; 97 and (3) "[t]he product or
service must be for personal or household use."98 The AAA makes the
initial determination of whether a case is a consumer case, subject to
redetermination by the arbitrator. 99
A. Processof AAA ProtocolCompliance Review
If a consumer case involves a claim for compensatory damages of
$75,000 or less, the AAA's procedure is for the AAA itself to review the
arbitration clause for compliance with the Consumer Due Process
Protocol. 00 After undertaking this review, "[i]f the Association determines
that

. . .

a dispute resolution clause on its face, substantially and materially

deviates from the minimum due process standards of this Protocol, the
95. Throughout this Part, we describe the AAA's procedures either as set out in its
rules and other publications or as explained to us in discussions with knowledgeable AAA
personnel. The extent to which the AAA's actual practices are consistent with this
description is a subject of our empirical findings infraPart VI of this Article.

96. AM.

ARBITRATION ASS'N, SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF

CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES RULE C-1 (a) (2005), availableat http://www.adr.org/aaa/
ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/documentlmdaw/mdax/-edisp/adrstg 004
127.pdf [hereinafter AAA CONSUMER RULES].
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also JAMS CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55, at n.1
("These standards are applicable where a company systematically places an arbitration
clause in its agreements with individual consumers and there is minimal, if any, negotiation
between the parties as to the procedures or other terms of the arbitration clause. A consumer
is defined as an individual who seeks or acquires any goods or services, including financial
services, primarily for personal family or household purposes.").
99. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 96, r. C-l(a) ("The AAA will have the
discretion to apply or not to apply the Supplementary Procedures and the parties will be able
to bring any disputes concerning the application or non-application to the attention of the
arbitrator.").
100.

AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, RULES UPDATES-CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS: NOTICE TO

CONSUMERS

AND

BUSINESSES 8 (2007) (on file with Tennessee Law Review) [hereinafter

AAA RULES UPDATES].
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Association may decline to administer cases arising under this clause." 10' If
the claim is02seeking over $75,000, issues of protocol compliance are for the
arbitrator. 1
AAA review of consumer arbitration clauses for protocol compliance
can take place both before and after a dispute arises. Before a dispute arises,
the AAA administers an "advance review" procedure similar to the
procedure under its Employment Arbitration Rules. 0 3 According to the
AAA, "[i]f a business intends to use the arbitration services of the
Association in a predispute arbitration clause that involves consumers, it
shall, at least thirty (30) days before the planned effective date of the clause
(1) notify the Association of its intention to do so; and (2) provide the
Association with a copy of the clause."'' 4 If the business fails to seek
advance review, the AAA "reserves the right to decline its administrative
services.'' 1 5 The description of the AAA's process for advance review of
consumer arbitration clauses, while available on the AAA web site, 10 6 is not
included in either the AAA's Commercial Arbitration Rules 0 7 or its
Supplementary Procedures for Resolution of Consumer-Related
Disputes. 1 8 By comparison, the provision for advance review of
employment arbitration clauses is set out in the AAA's Employment
Arbitration Rules.'0 9
The potential benefits of advance review are at least twofold. First,
advance review permits the business and the AAA to resolve any issues of
protocol compliance before a dispute arises so that the compliance review
process does not interfere with the resolution of the dispute between the
101. Id.
102. AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 33. Likewise, "issues that are not clearly
substantial and material deviations will be presented to the arbitrator for determination."
AAA RULES UPDATES, supra note 100, at 8.
103. AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 33 ("[B]usinesses are asked to obtain advance
review by AAA of the program to determine compliance with the protocols."); AAA RULES
UPDATES, supra note 100, at 8 (describing advance review process); see AM. ARBITRATION
ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES r. 2 (2009),
available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=FUCM/ADRSTG004362&amp;
amp;amp;revision=latestreleased [hereinafter AAA EMPLOYMENT RULES] ("An employer
intending to incorporate these rules or to refer to the dispute resolution services of the AAA
in an employment ADR plan, shall, at least 30 days prior to the planned effective date of the
program: (i) notify the Association of its intention to do so and, (ii) provide the Association
with a copy of the employment dispute resolution plan.").
104. AAA RULES UPDATES, supra note 100, at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION
PROCEDURES (2009), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=/UCM/
ADRSTG_004103&amp;amp;amp;revision=latestreleased.
108. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supranote 96.

109. AAA EMPLOYMENT

RULES,

supra note 103, r. 2.
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business and consumer. Second, advance review extends the benefits of the
Protocol to all consumers who agree to a form contract with the business,
not just to those who are party to an arbitration before the AAA.
Post-dispute protocol review is to occur once a claimant files a demand
for arbitration with the AAA. Under the AAA's arbitration rules, the
demand must include a copy of the arbitration clause, but need not include
the entire contract. 110 Accordingly, in conducting its review for protocol
compliance, the "AAA reviews the parties' arbitration clause only, and not
the entire contract.""'
Before undertaking administration of the case, the AAA case intake
staff are to review the arbitration clause for compliance with the Consumer
Due Process Protocol. 12 The case intake staff also are to check the name of
the business against the AAA "business list," a list of all businesses of
which the AAA is aware that mention (or, at some point, mentioned) the
AAA in their consumer arbitration clauses. If the business is one that has
refused either to waive an objectionable provision or to pay its share of
arbitration costs in a prior consumer case, it should be classified as
"unacceptable" on the AAA business list, and the AAA will refuse to
administer future cases involving the business.' 13
If the clause complies with the Protocol, the business is to be classified
as "acceptable" on the AAA business list. Provided that the business pays
its share of the arbitration fees, the case will proceed to arbitration. 1 4 If the
clause does not comply, the AAA's procedure is to contact the business to
determine whether the business will waive the offending provision or
provisions not only for the present dispute but also for all future disputes." 5
110. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 96, r. C-2(a).
111. AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, AAA REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES 1, available at
(2011); see also JAMS
http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_010609
EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55 ("In assessing whether the standards are
met and whether to accept the arbitration agreement, JAMS, as the ADR Provider, will limit
its inquiry to a facial review of the clause or procedure. If a factual inquiry is required, for
example, to determine compliance with the Minimum Standards, it must be conducted by an
arbitrator or court.").
112. AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 33-34 ("[S]pecially designated AAA staff
members review clauses submitted in consumer cases ... to check protocol compliance.").
The substance of this review is addressed in Part IV.B.
113. Ragan v. AT&T Corp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1194 (I11. App. Ct. 2005); JAMS
CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55; JAMS EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM
STANDARDS, supra note 55. Note that review of the AAA business list is not to replace

reviewing the arbitration clause itself, as the clause may have changed since the most recent
entry on the AAA business list.
114. See JAMS CONSUMER MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55; JAMS EMPLOYMENT
MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55. Assuming, of course, that the other requirements for

AAA administration are met, such as that the consumer paid his or her share of the
arbitrator's fees.

115.

See Ragan v. AT&T Corp., 824 N.E.2d 1183, 1194 (I11.App. Ct. 2005) (quoting
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Moreover, the AAA will advise the business regarding the changes that can
be made to bring the clause into compliance with the Protocol. If the
business does not waive the provision, AAA policy is to refuse to
administer the case.' 1 6 If the company is listed as "unacceptable" on the
AAA business list or if the business fails to pay the required fees, the AAA
likewise should refuse to administer the case.
If questions arise, the case intake staff can consult with a designated
AAA employee who maintains the AAA business list. Protocol review in
consumer cases differs from protocol review in employment cases, in which
a single AAA employee handles review centrally.' "1 In the consumer
setting, by comparison, the case intake staff conduct the review, while the
employee who maintains the AAA business list remains available for
consultation in individual cases.
B. Substance of AAA ProtocolCompliance Review
The Consumer Due Process Protocol sets out fifteen principles as
"embodiments of fundamental fairness" in dispute resolution.' In deciding
whether to administer a consumer case, the AAA reviews the arbitration
clause submitted with the arbitration demand for compliance with the Due
Process Protocol. This review is subject to several important constraints.

letter from AAA employee to AT&T dated Oct. 29, 2002) ("The AAA's willingness to
administer disputes under AT&T's arbitration agreement is contingent upon AT&T's
continued willingness to have all past, present[,] and future consumer-related disputes
administered in accordance with the Consumer Rules and the Protocol."). For a sample letter
that is in the public domain, see Molly A. Bargenquest, Letter to Melissa Hoag Sherman &
Kevin Mason, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS:
ENFORCEABILITY AND OTHER Topics app. (5th ed. 2007).
AAA RULES UPDATES, supra note 100; see also JAMS CONSUMER MINIMUM
supra note 55 ("JAMS will administer arbitrations pursuant to mandatory predispute arbitration clauses between companies and consumers only if the contract arbitration
116.

STANDARDS,

clause and specified applicable rules comply with the following minimum standards of
fairness."); JAMS EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55 ("If JAMS becomes
aware that an arbitration clause or procedure does not comply with the Minimum Standards,
it will notify the employer of the Minimum Standards and inform the employer that the
arbitration demand will not be accepted unless there is full compliance with those
standards.").

117. Bingham & Sarraf, supranote 16, at 321 ("The internal mechanism the AAA uses
to enforce the Protocol is for a single employee to review each and every employer
arbitration plan in which the AAA is named as third-party administrator. If the plan does not
comport with the Protocol, the AAA advises the employer to revise it, and the AAA refuses
to administer any arbitration under the plan until it comports with the Protocol. The fact that
a single employee centrally reviews all plans ensures a certain consistency in internal
administration.").
118. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 1.
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First, as noted above, the AAA reviews the text of the arbitration
clause, not the entire contract, to determine protocol compliance.11 9 To the
extent that a problematic provision is not located in the arbitration clause
but rather is found1elsewhere
in the contract, the provision is not subject to
20
the AAA's review.
Second, evaluating compliance with some principles of the Due Process
Protocol may require factual determinations rather than simply a review of
the text of the arbitration clause. To the extent factual inquiries are
necessary in a particular case, the matter12 becomes one for the arbitrator
rather than for the AAA's review process. 1
Third, it has been the longstanding policy of the AAA to comply with
any court order directing that the administration of an arbitration proceed in
a particular manner. 122 Typically, the AAA is not a party to such a court
proceeding; rather, only the parties to the arbitration clause are parties to
the court order. Nonetheless, the AAA's policy is to defer to the court order
compelling arbitration and to administer the case, even if the clause
includes provisions that are inconsistent with the Consumer Due Process
Protocol. However, AAA policy is to administer the case consistently with
the Protocol, unless the court order directs otherwise.
Fourth, administrative review is limited to cases seeking $75,000 or
less-the same cutoff that the AAA uses for the reduced fee schedule in its
Consumer Arbitration Rules. 123 In determining the amount of the claim, the
AAA considers only compensatory damages. 24 It does not consider
amounts sought as punitive damages, interest, or attorneys' fees. The
Protocol still applies to cases in which the claimant seeks more than
$75,000; however, in those cases, the25 arbitrator decides on the application
of the Protocol rather than the AAA.1
In our empirical analysis below, 126 we evaluate the effectiveness of the
AAA's review for protocol compliance. We examine the arbitration clauses
in the cases in the sample under the same standards the AAA seeks to apply
in its review.
The rest of this Section describes our understanding of those
27
standards. 1
119. See supra text accompanying notes I 10-11.
120. AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 107, r. R-7 (2009).
Presumably challenges to such a provision could still be made to the arbitrator.
121. Cf JAMS EMPLOYMENT MINIMUM STANDARDS, supra note 55.
122. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, reporter's cmts. to princ. 12.
The description in this paragraph is based on discussions with AAA personnel
knowledgeable of its policies and practices in administering consumer cases.
123. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 96, r. C-8 ("Administrative Fees").
124. Id.
125. See supra text accompanying note 102.
126. See infra Part VI.
127. The description below is based on discussions with AAA personnel
knowledgeable about its protocol compliance review and on guidance given to case intake
staff who conduct that review. The principles below are listed in the Protocol. CONSUMER
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Principle 1. Fundamentally Fair Process: As discussed above, the
text of the Protocol is not clear whether Principle 1 states a separate
requirement of fundamental fairness or whether it merely indicates
that the remaining principles of the Protocol protect fundamental
fairness. 128 Nonetheless, in reviewing clauses, the AAA is to
consider whether the procedures set out in the arbitration clause are
unduly one-sided-whether they unduly favor the business in ways
not addressed in other principles of the Protocol.
Principle 2. Access to Information: The AAA's review is limited
to the arbitration clause itself. It does not examine the surrounding
circumstances to evaluate whether the consumer was able to obtain
"full and accurate information" regarding the ADR program. 129 As
a result, the AAA's protocol compliance review does not consider
this Principle. Presumably, the consumer could raise the issue of
compliance before the arbitrator.
Principle 3. Independent and Impartial Neutral: Various contract
provisions might violate the requirement that the arbitrator be
independent and impartial. Certainly a provision permitting the
business to select the arbitrator unilaterally or to control the list of
prospective arbitrators would violate this Principle. 130 In addition,
provisions setting out required qualifications for arbitrators
likewise might be problematic. For example, a requirement that the
or service at issue
arbitrator work at a company that sells the food
M
T
would be objectionable under this Principle.
Principle 4. Quality and Competence of Neutrals: This Principle
focuses on the quality of the arbitrators named by the AAA. The
AAA views this Principle as directed at the AAA's screening and
training of potential arbitrators (the AAA's policy is to appoint only
attorney arbitrators for consumer arbitrations, for example), rather
than at the parties' arbitration clause. On this view, there is nothing
for the AAA to review in the arbitration clause with respect to this
Principle.
Principle 5. Small Claims: This Principle requires that the
arbitration agreement "should make it clear that all parties retain

DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54.
128. See supratext accompanying notes 80-82.
129. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 2.
130. See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938-39 (4th Cir. 1999)
("The Hooters rules also provide a mechanism for selecting a panel of three arbitrators that
is crafted to ensure a biased decisionmaker. The employee and Hooters each select an
arbitrator, and the two arbitrators in turn select a third. Good enough, except that the
employee's arbitrator and the third arbitrator must be selected from a list of arbitrators
created exclusively by Hooters.").
131. Cf Drahozal, supra note 38, at 733 (describing provision in franchise agreement
requiring that arbitrators work in "Qualified Food Service Position").
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the right to seek relief in a small claims court for disputes or claims
within the scope of its jurisdiction.' ' 132 The AAA's Supplementary
Procedures for Resolution of Consumer-Related Disputes provide
133
that "[p]arties can still take their claims to a small claims court."'
As such, unless the arbitration clause expressly precludes the
consumer from going to small claims court, the AAA treats this
Principle as satisfied.
" Principle 6. Reasonable Cost: The AAA addresses the Principle in
part through its arbitration rules, which provide for the business to
pay all administrative costs for claims of $75,000 or less and for the
parties to share equally the arbitrator's fees, capped at $125 or $375
for consumers, depending on the size of the claim. 34 In addition,
the AAA reviews clauses for provisions that would increase
arbitration costs above the amounts provided under its rules. Thus,
a clause that requires the parties to share equally all arbitration
costs (not just the arbitrator's fees) would be objectionable under
this Principle. Similarly, a clause that requires three arbitrators
rather than one arbitrator would likewise be objectionable because
it would increase (potentially triple) the consumer's costs.
" Principle 7. Reasonably Convenient Location: This Principle
addresses clauses that would require the consumer to travel
unreasonably long distances to attend an in-person arbitration
hearing.' A clause that requires arbitration to take place at the
business's location would be problematic for a business that
provides goods or services nationally. For businesses that typically
sell locally, however, the AAA will not find such a clause to violate
the Protocol because the location of the business would be
convenient for most consumers, although the arbitrator may find a
violation in a particular case based on the particular circumstances
of that case.
* Principle 8. Reasonable Time Limits: This Principle requires that
arbitration take place "without undue delay."' 36 The AAA interprets
this Principle as primarily applicable to its rules and procedures,
which set out the time limits for the arbitration process. Only if the
arbitration clause unduly lengthens those time limits so as to

132.

133.
134.
135.

CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 5.
AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 96, r, C-1 (d).
AAA CONSUMER RULES, supra note 96, r. C-8 ("Administrative Fees").
See also AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, LOCALE DETERMINATIONS: AAA (2007),

available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_013007 ("For consumer
disputes, if the claim is under $75,000 then AAA will require the business to waive the
locale if the locale is not reasonably convenient for the consumer.").
136.

CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 8.
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unreasonably delay the arbitration proceeding would there be an
issue for the AAA's review. 137
Principle 9. Right to Representation: This Principle provides that
the consumer has the right to the representative of his or her choice.
An arbitration clause that precluded the consumer from being
represented by counsel (or other representative) would violate this
Principle.
Principle 10. Mediation: This Principle encourages but does not
require the use of mediation. As a result, in the AAA's view, there
is nothing for it to review.
Principle 11. Agreements to Arbitrate: See the discussion above of
Principle 2.138

*

*

*

Principle 12. Arbitration Hearings: The sorts of provisions that
would violate this Principle include provisions that require the
arbitrator to decide the case on the basis of documents only (i.e.,
bar an in-person hearing) or otherwise restrict the arbitrator's
discretion as to how to resolve the case.
Principle 13. Access to Information: By "Access to Information,"
the Protocol means discovery. Thus, contract provisions that unduly
restrict the amount of discovery in the arbitration would violate this
Principle.
Principle 14. Arbitral Remedies: This Principle requires that the
same remedies be available in arbitration as would be available in
court. This Principle can be interpreted in two ways. The broader
interpretation is that the remedies generally available in courtsuch as punitive damages and injunctive relief-also must be
available in arbitration. Under that interpretation, contractual
limitations on remedies would not be permitted. The narrower
interpretation is that a contractual limitation on remedies would be
permissible in a particular case so long as the limitation was
enforceable under the applicable state law. In applyin3 this
principle, the AAA has adopted the broader interpretation. 9 As

137. Interestingly, in Martinez v. Master Protection Corp., 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004) (alternate holding), the AAA evidently applied the comparable principle of
the Employment Due Process Protocol to refuse to enforce a provision that shortened the
statute of limitations for bringing a claim. Id. at 667 ("AAA's policy was against conducting
arbitrations on employment plans such as [the employer's], which gave parties less time to
assert claims than would otherwise be available by statute."); see EMPLOYMENT DUE
PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54. By contrast, Principle 8 of the Consumer Due Process
Protocol focuses solely on eliminating delays in the arbitration process, rather than on
provisions that reduce the time for bringing a claim. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL,
supra note 54, reporter's cmts. to princ. 8 ("[I]t is not enough that the agreement places strict
time limitations on procedural steps if these limitations are not effectively enforced.").
138. See supra text accompanying note 129.
139. Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 90 (citing Affidavit of Neil B. Currie on Behalf of
the American Arbitration Association in Response and Objection to a Subpoena for
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interpreted by the AAA, clauses that preclude the recovery of
punitive damages or consequential damages violate this Principle.
In addition, clauses that cap the amount of damages to something
less than full compensatory damages or preclude any award of
attorneys' fees would be objectionable.
Principle 15. Arbitration Awards: The AAA interprets this
Principle as generally addressing (and dealt with by) its rules on the
awards,
making of an award, although a provision that bars written
40
for example, presumably would violate this Principle.
V. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A. Research Questions
The empirical question of interest is how effectively the AAA enforces
In answering that
compliance with the Consumer Due Process Protocol.
41
questions.1
subsidiary
of
series
a
consider
we
question,
First, to what extent do arbitration clauses giving rise to AAA
consumer arbitrations comply with the Due Process Protocol of their own
right? The greater the extent to which clauses comply on their own, the less
need for the AAA to enforce compliance. 42 Conversely, if many arbitration
clauses are problematic under the Protocol, effective AAA compliance
review becomes even more important.
Second, how effective is AAA review of arbitration clauses for
compliance with the Consumer Due Process Protocol? Does the AAA
identify and respond appropriately to problematic provisions? Or are there
systematic gaps in the AAA's review efforts?
Documents Issued by Plaintiff, Ragan v. AT&T Corp., No. 02-L-168 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 15,
2002)) ("[O]n one occasion, the AAA asserted that an agreement violated the Consumer
Protocol by allowing only recovery of direct damages in most cases and barring recovery of
punitive and other damages in all cases, without suggesting that its decision depended on
whether a court would enforce a similar limitation."); see also Ragan v. AT&T Corp., 824
N.E.2d 1183, 1194 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (quoting Currie affidavit).
140. Weidemaier, supra note 17, at 89 ("To be sure, businesses might forbid reasoned,
written awards in the arbitration agreement itself; it is unclear whether providers like the
AAA would view such contract terms as consistent with the due process protocols.").
141. In addition to these research questions, we examine several other issues that arise
in connection with the due process protocols. In particular, we look at (1) how frequently
parties arbitrate their disputes based on post-dispute (rather than pre-dispute) arbitration
agreements; (2) how often businesses include class arbitration waivers in their consumer
arbitration clauses; and (3) how the AAA administers disputes arising out of the health care
industry in its consumer caseload. Our findings are reported infra app. 3.
142. Of course, the fact that a clause currently complies with the Protocol does not
mean that it always did so. Its current compliance may be due to prior AAA enforcement
actions. Thus, an additional question we consider is the extent to which the AAA's protocol
compliance efforts have resulted in changes to the terms of consumer arbitration agreements.

316
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Third, to what extent does the AAA refuse to administer consumer
cases because of Protocol compliance issues? The AAA has indicated that
when it identifies an issue of protocol compliance, it will refuse to
administer the case unless the business waives the objectionable
provision.1 43 How often does the AAA refuse to administer cases and under
what circumstances?
Fourth, how do businesses respond to AAA enforcement of protocol
compliance? A business might respond in several ways. First, the business
might waive the objectionable provision or change its arbitration clause to
remove the objectionable provision, or both. Second, the business might
refuse to waive or change the provision, resulting in the AAA declining to
administer the case and future cases involving the business. Third, the
business might obtain a court order compelling arbitration of the dispute.
Fourth, the business might modify its arbitration clause for future disputes,
either by switching to another arbitration provider (that perhaps will
administer cases under the objectionable provision) or by removing the predispute arbitration clause altogether.'44
B. Data & Methodology
Our data set for this study consists of 301 AAA consumer arbitration
cases closed by an award between April 2007 and December 2007 ("the
case file sample"). This case file sample is subject to several
possible
45
selection biases, which we have described in detail elsewhere.
To obtain information on the arbitration clause and on the details of
AAA protocol compliance review, we reviewed the original case files for
the cases in the case file sample. For each of the cases, we examined the
arbitration clause (which is attached to the demand for arbitration) and
assessed the extent to which the clause complied with the Consumer Due
Process Protocol.146 In evaluating compliance, we applied the standards
used by the AAA as described above. We also determined from the file
whether the AAA case intake staff identified any protocol violation and, if
so, whether the AAA obtained a waiver of the violation from the business.

143. See supra text accompanying note 101.
144. See Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 670 ("I have heard anecdotally from provider
employees that businesses and employers often waive terms that conflict with the due
process protocols. I know of no other evidence to support this assertion .... ).
145. Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA
ConsumerArbitrations,25 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 843, 868-69 (2010).
146. Thus, we examined all arbitration clauses that gave rise to a consumer arbitration
before the AAA that was resolved by an award from April to December 2007. The
arbitration clauses in the case file sample are not a random sample of all consumer
arbitration clauses, nor are they even a random sample of all consumer arbitration clauses
specifying the AAA as arbitration provider.
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One file was missing the arbitration clause. 147 The business in the case
appeared in at least one other case in the case file sample; the clause in that
case contained no provisions violating the protocol. Because we could not
be certain that the same clause was involved in the two cases, however, we
treated the clause as missing. For another file, the arbitration clause
appeared to be incomplete. While the file included a lengthy portion of the
arbitration clause, it appeared that the claimant might not have provided a
copy of the entire clause. Although the clause had no problematic
provisions in the portion that we were able to review, we excluded it from
the case file sample because we could not be certain what provisions were
included in the rest of the clause. Accordingly, the case file sample as used
to evaluate AAA protocol enforcement consists of 299 AAA consumer
arbitration clauses.r48
We used the case file sample to evaluate the extent to which arbitration
clauses in the case file sample complied with the Consumer Due Process
Protocol and how well the AAA applied its standards in reviewing
arbitration clauses for protocol compliance.
The case files contained no indication of whether the business had
sought advance review (i.e., pre-dispute review) of its arbitration clause for
protocol compliance. To obtain information on business use of advance
review, we examined the AAA business list, 49 which included a notation
when the business sought advance review of its arbitration clause. We
verified those notations against AAA files documenting the request for
advance review. We also examined a sample of other entries on the AAA
business list to ensure that requests for advance review had not been
misclassified. 50
The AAA does not maintain a list of the cases it refuses to administer
for failure to comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol. To estimate
the number of cases the AAA refused to administer during 2007, we started
with a list of "pre-filing" cases provided by the AAA ("AAA pre-filing
cases"). "Pre-filing" cases are cases submitted to the AAA that do not
satisfy the filing requirements of the AAA Consumer Rules. Such
requirements include a completed demand for arbitration, a copy of the
arbitration clause, 15' and payment of the appropriate fee, 5 2 as well as the

147. The file clearly had included the arbitration clause at one point, but by the time we
obtained the case file for review the clause was no longer included.
148. Because the rest of the file that was missing the arbitration clause was complete,
we were able to use this case in examining other aspects of AAA consumer arbitrations.
149. See supra text accompanying note 113. We used the AAA business list as of April
25, 2008.
150. We found one additional case in which the business had sought advance review.
151. AAA CONSUMER RULES, supranote 96, r. C-2.

152.

AAA CONSUMER RULES, supranote 96, r. C-8.
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business's payment
53
of its share of the fees and waiver of any protocol

violations.'

The AAA pre-filing cases include cases that the AAA refused to
administer because of protocol violations as well as cases brought by a
consumer (or business, for that matter) that did not meet the requirements
for filing the claim. 154 To distinguish between these types of cases, we
crosschecked the AAA pre-filing cases against the AAA business list. If the
business was listed as "unacceptable" on the AAA business list, we
presumptively treated the case as one that the AAA refused to administer
because of a protocol violation. In such cases, we further examined the
AAA files documenting the business's status on the AAA business list. In a
number of cases, we were able to confirm from those files that the AAA
refused to administer
a particular case because of protocol
155
noncompliance.
Finally, we obtained data on how businesses responded to AAA
enforcement of the Consumer Due Process Protocol. As described above, a
business might respond to AAA enforcement actions in several ways.15 6 We
again used the AAA business list (and supporting files) as the best available
source of data on such actions.
As discussed above, the AAA classifies the businesses on the AAA
business list either as "acceptable"--the AAA will administer consumer
arbitrations involving the business-or "unacceptable"-the AAA will not
administer consumer arbitrations involving the business.157 For each entry,
the AAA business list also includes a short explanation of the business's
current status as acceptable or unacceptable. 158 We used those explanations
to provide an initial characterization of how the business responded to AAA
153. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
154. This may occur because the claimant decides not to pursue the case, or because the
parties settle before the filing requirements are met.
155. If the business's status on the AAA business list changed because of some action
during the case we were examining, the correspondence relating to that case would be in the
files. For example, if the AAA added the business to the AAA business list as
"unacceptable" because it refused to waive a problematic provision or failed to pay its share
of arbitration fees, that correspondence would be in the AAA business list file. If, however,
the AAA declined to administer the case because the business was already listed as
unacceptable because of prior events, we would find no evidence of the later refusal (only
the prior one) in the AAA business list file.
156. See supra text accompanying note 144.
157. The AAA also includes a sub-category of "acceptable businesses" on the AAA
business list-typically large entities for which in the past there had been some confusion
over the appropriate contact person when a consumer brought a claim against the business.
For those businesses, the AAA business list typically identifies the appropriate contact
person to receive the demand for arbitration.
158. If the business's arbitration clause complied with the protocol at the time it was
first reviewed, and if the business had always paid its share of the arbitration fees, the
business would be listed but only with the date of the first review.
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protocol compliance review. We then sought to verify that characterization
by reviewing the AAA's files supporting the AAA business list entry. For
some types of entries, we examined all available supporting files. For
others, time constraints limited us to examining a random sample of the
supporting files.' 59 We also collected data on the underlying protocol issue,
if any, involved.
Using this data, we sought to estimate how frequently businesses
responded to AAA protocol review by (1) waiving the objectionable
provision for future cases or updating their clauses to eliminate problematic
provisions; (2) refusing to update their clauses or simply not responding to
the AAA; (3) updating their clauses to replace the AAA with a different
160
arbitration provider; or (4) removing the arbitration clause altogether.
Our access to all of the data from the AAA is subject to a nondisclosure agreement entered into with the AAA.
VI. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This Part presents our findings on each of the research questions of
interest: (1) to what extent do the consumer arbitration clauses in the case
file sample comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol; (2) how
effective is AAA review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance; (3)
how frequently does the AAA refuse to administer consumer cases because
of noncompliance with the Protocol; and (4) how do businesses respond to
AAA enforcement efforts? 16 1 Our focus is solely on the AAA. Although

159. For AAA business list entries indicating that the business did not respond to the
initial case filing, we originally examined a random sample of supporting files. Our
examination revealed that in some cases businesses failed to pay their share of the arbitration
fees, while in others they failed to waive protocol violations or update their arbitration
clauses to remove protocol violations; therefore, we expanded our examination to include
supporting files for all of those entries. For AAA business list entries indicating that the
business did not respond to a follow-up contact by the AAA to update its arbitration clause
or to waive protocol violations in all future cases, we examined a random sample of
supporting files. Because those files confirmed that the business failed to waive a protocol
violation or update its arbitration clause, we did not expand our review. We examined a
handful of files in which the AAA listed the business as acceptable with no further comment.
Our examination of the cases in the case file sample provides a more satisfactory test of the
effectiveness of AAA protocol compliance review because it includes cases that might not
be listed on the AAA business list. For all other types of AAA business list entries, we
examined all the supporting files.
160. The AAA business list files contain no information on how frequently businesses
seek court orders compelling arbitration of cases the AAA refuses to administer.
161. In addition, in Appendix 3 we set out findings as to several related questions of
interest: (1) How frequent are post-dispute (as opposed to pre-dispute) agreements to
arbitrate?; (2) How often do arbitration clauses contain class arbitration waivers?; and (3)
How does the AAA administer consumer cases arising out of the health care industry?
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other providers also have promulgated due process protocols, we have no
data on their enforcement practices.
A. ProblematicClauses
The substantial majority of arbitration clauses we examined contained
no provisions that violated the Consumer Due Process Protocol as applied
by the AAA. Consistent with the AAA's treatment of the cases, we
examined cases seeking $75,000 or less separately from cases seeking more
than $75,000 (a much smaller group) and cases seeking non-monetary

relief.162
Of the 271 clauses in cases seeking $75,000 or less in the case file
sample, 208 (or 76.8%) had no provision that violated the Protocol, as
shown in Figure 1. Of the 23 clauses in cases seeking more than $75,000,
18 (or 78.3%) had no provisions that violated the Protocol. An additional 5
cases sought no monetary remedy; 3 of those 5 clauses (or 60.0%) had no
problematic provisions. Overall, then, 229 of 299163 clauses (or 76.6%) had
no provisions that violated the Protocol.' 64

162. See, e.g., AAA CONSUMER RULES, supranote 96, r. C-8.
163. As discussed above, two files for cases in the case file sample did not contain
complete arbitration clauses. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
164. A number of businesses appeared in the case file sample more than once, so that
their arbitration clauses were counted multiple times. That may be the better approach, since
it weights the clauses according to the frequency with which they gave rise to disputes that
were arbitrated to an award. By comparison, 78.1% (150 of 192) of the clauses in the case
file sample (counting each business's clause only once) included no problematic provisions
under the Protocol.
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Figure 1:
Number of Consumer Arbitration Clause with Protocol Violations by Amount Claimed
(Cass =299)
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There was no statistically significant difference in the frequency of
protocol violations across categories of amount claimed"6-ven though
the AAA does not review clauses for protocol compliance in cases seeking
more than $75,000. This likely is true for several reasons. First, the
Consumer Due Process Protocol applies to all consumer arbitrations, not
just those seeking $75,000 or less. The difference is that protocol
compliance is an issue for the arbitrator to decide in cases seeking more
than $75,000 rather than a matter for review by the AAA. Second,
businesses ars unlikely to be able to differentiate in their standard form
contract terms between consumers based on the amount of any likely claim.
Third, to the extent businesses seek to develop a reputation for fair dealing,
they will not distinguish between consumers in their contracting practices.
A total of 70 (or 23.4%) of the clauses in the case file sample contained
at least one provision that violated the Consumer Due Process Protocol as
applied by the AAA. Of those clauses, 63 (or 90.0%) included one
problematic provision, 5 (or 7.1%) included two problematic provisions,
and 2 (or 2.9%) included three problematic provisions.
By far, the most common problematic provision was one that dealt with
arbitration costs in a manner inconsistent with Principle 6 of the Protocol,
which requires that arbitration be aueine catreasonable cost to the
165.

The Pearson's Chi-squared statistic is 0.0271 (DF =

and p = 0.8690), which

means we fail to reject the null hypothesis that protocol violations are not associated with
amount claimed if categorized into claims $75,000 or less and greater than $75,000.
Including cases seeking non-monetary relief resulted in cells with a minimum expected
count of less than five.
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consumer. 166 Of the 70 clauses with at least one problematic provision, 48
(or 68.5%) contained a provision inconsistent with Principle 6. Typically,
the provisions either required three arbitrators to resolve the dispute (thus,
increasing the cost over the cost of a single arbitrator) or specified that the
consumer was to share the administrative fees with the business. 167 The
second most common type of problematic provision was one that limited
the available remedies contrary to Principle 14,168 usually by precluding or
limiting the recovery of punitive damages. Of the 70 clauses, 17 (or 24.3%)
included such a provision. Other problematic clauses were much less
common: 8 clauses (or 11.4%) specified a potentially inconvenient location
for the hearing contrary to Principle 7;169 4 clauses (or 5.7%) were
inconsistent with the requirement of an impartial arbitrator under Principle
discovery contrary to Principle 13.171
3;170 and 1 clause (1.4%) limited
172
results.
the
Figure 2 summarizes
Figure 2:
TypesofProtocol Violations as Consumer Arbitration Clauses

(Cas =299)
-

250

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

...

-

...

--....
...

...
229

.0

-

--

-

-

----------

-

200-

-

-!

-

--

- -

--

-

b

'0

--

-

-

-

--17

Pr0ndpleI Pci* 3

P1tt* 6

l7

PrndpL9

frlndplel2
0

11c4*e3Prbxdplel4 NoVoion

Further description of the four clauses that were problematic under
Principle 3 may be of interest, given that an impartial arbitrator is central to

166. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supranote 54, princ. 6.
167. Under the AAA consumer procedures, the consumer pays a share of the
arbitrator's fees but does not pay any of the AAA's administrative fees. AAA CONSUMER
RULES, supra note 96, r. C-8 ("Administrative Fees").
168. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supranote 54, princ. 14.
169. Id.princ. 7.
170. Id. princ. 3.
171. Id.princ. 13.
172. Note that the totals here sum to more than the total number of cases because a few
clauses contained more than one provision that violated the Protocol.
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the fairness of an arbitration proceeding. 73 None of the clauses gave the
business control over arbitrator selection or the pool of prospective
arbitrators. Instead, all of the clauses were problematic because they
required the arbitrator to have qualifications that might give rise to
questions about the arbitrator's impartiality. Three of the clauses were in
car sales contracts and required, at least under some circumstances, that the
arbitrator be a certified master mechanic. 74 The other clause was in a home
inspection contract and required that the arbitrator be an experienced
member of one or another association of home inspectors.
Presumably, the reason qualification provisions are problematic is that
they would effectively require the arbitrators to be employed by or engaged
in the type of business involved in the arbitration. In addition, these
required qualifications conflict with the AAA's policy of appointing only
attorneys with ten or more years of experience or retired judges as
arbitrators in consumer cases, unless the parties agree otherwise postdispute. Although the AAA properly identified the provisions as ones that
violated Principle 3 of the Protocol, 75 the provisions illustrate well the
trade-off between
expertise and impartiality that commonly arises in
176
arbitration.

Here, again, we face possible selection bias in the case file
sample. Initially, clauses with provisions that violate the Consumer
Due Process Protocol might discourage consumers from bringing
claims (as might provisions that were waived by the business but
never modified in the contract), so our results might understate the
frequency of problematic provisions. We have no data on how
frequently consumers fail to bring claims, so we cannot test for this
possibility. As an imperfect proxy, we can examine whether damages
limitations seem to deter consumers from asserting claims for
punitive damages. In the case file sample, consumers sought punitive
173. See, e.g., Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 682
(Cal. 2000) (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 176 (Cal. 1981)) (stating that
the requirement of a "neutral arbitrator . . . is essential to ensuring the integrity of the
arbitration process").
174. Two of the clauses required the presiding arbitrator to be a certified master
mechanic when three arbitrators were selected; the requirement of three arbitrators itself is
problematic under Principle 6 (reasonable cost) of the Protocol.
175. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 3 ("Independent and
Impartial Neutral").
176. Sphere Drake Ins., Ltd. v. All Am. Life Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 2002)
("The more experience the panel has, and the smaller the number of repeat players, the more
likely it is that the panel will contain some actual or potential friends, counselors, or business
rivals of the parties. Yet all participants may think the expertise-impartiality tradeoff
worthwhile."); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor's
Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1021 (1996) (describing
"technical areas" such as medicine in which "[t]hose who can understand the facts will be
found disproportionately among specialists in the field, i.e., those with a presumed bias").
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damages in 6 of 17 (or 35.3%) cases in which the arbitration clause
contained a damages limitation, and in 72 of 282 (or 25.5%) cases in
which the arbitration clause did not. Thus, consumers were more
likely to assert a claim for punitive damages when facing a damages
limitation than when not facing a damages limitation (although the
number of cases with damages limitations is too small for reliable
statistical testing). Certainly asserting a claim for punitive damages
after having brought a claim in arbitration costs much less than
bringing a claim in the first place. Thus, as noted, this is an imperfect
proxy; but, the results suggest at least one circumstance in which a
standard form contract provision may not discourage consumers from
asserting a claim.
We also considered carefully the possibility that arbitration
clauses may have had more (or fewer) problematic provisions and
that AAA compliance review might have been less (or more)
effective in non-awarded cases than in awarded cases-that our
results are subject to selection bias because we studied only awarded
cases. Several considerations give us some degree of confidence that
this source of selection bias is not a serious problem with our results.
First, using a AAA consumer dataset that included all cases
closed from April through December 2007, we were able to
determine that the non-awarded cases appear to have been
administered properly under the Protocol at least so far as the
administrative fees assessed to consumers.' 7 The most common type
of protocol violation in the case file sample (awarded cases) was a
violation of Principle 6, which requires that the cost of arbitration to
consumers be reasonable.' 78 The contract provisions that violated this
Principle either sought to impose on the consumer a greater share of
costs than permitted under the AAA Consumer Rules or required
three arbitrators to resolve the dispute. 79 In 353 out of 361 (97.8%)
of the non-awarded cases with claims seeking $75,000 or less,
consumers paid no administrative fees as provided in the AAA
Consumer Arbitration Rules. In 7 of the 8 cases in which the
consumer paid fees, it appears that the business may have failed to
pay its share of fees and that the consumer chose to advance the fees
in order to proceed with the case. In 1 case, the consumer and the
business shared the fees.' 80 Moreover, in all of the non-awarded cases
with claims seeking $75,000 or less, one arbitrator was appointed
177. Although the AAA consumer dataset has slightly lower accuracy rates for AAA
administrative fees assessed per party than other variables, it is the only data available for
this purpose. For further discussion of the AAA consumer dataset, see Drahozal & Zyontz,
supranote 145, at 867-71.
178. CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 6.
179. See supra text accompanying note 134.

180.

We have no data on the share of the arbitrator's fees paid by the consumer.
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rather than three. 181 In short, the cases appear to have been
administered properly under the cost provisions of the Protocol and
the AAA Consumer Rules. For other principles of the Protocol,
evaluating compliance is difficult, if not impossible, without
examining the parties' arbitration clause.
Second, we compared the businesses involved in the non-awarded
cases from the AAA consumer dataset closed from April through
December 2007 to the businesses involved in the awarded cases in
the case file sample, as well as to the AAA business list. Of the 361
non-awarded cases seeking $75,000 or less, 158 involved businesses
that matched those in the case file sample. None of the clauses in
those cases included unwaived protocol violations. Another 144 cases
involved businesses that were classified as acceptable on the AAA
business list. As to these 302 cases (83.7% of the 361 non-awarded
cases), all indications are that the arbitration clause did not include an
unwaived protocol violation. Another 39 cases involved businesses
that did not appear on the AAA business list.'8 2 For the case file
sample, 38 cases involved businesses that did not appear on the AAA
business list, a larger percentage than for the non-awarded cases. The
remaining 20 cases involved businesses that were classified as
unacceptable on the AAA business list. Based on the date of their
most recent status change on the AAA business list, 15 of those
businesses appear to have been added after the non-awarded case we
were considering was filed. For the other 5, it is possible that they
could have been administered under a court order or a post-dispute
arbitration agreement. However, even assuming that the AAA should
have refused to administer all of those cases, the percentage of
unwaived violations among the non-awarded cases would have been
5 out of 361 (or 1.4%).
Obviously, we cannot be certain that the frequency of protocol
violations and (more importantly) unwaived protocol violations is the same
in non-awarded cases as awarded cases. However, we have no reason to
believe that our focus on awarded cases results in any significant bias to our
results.
B. AAA Review of ProtocolCompliance

As discussed above, AAA review for protocol compliance is limited to
cases seeking $75,000 or less in compensatory damages. 83 We had 271
181. Many cases were closed before any arbitrators were appointed.
182. The businesses likely should have been reported so that they could be added to the
AAA business list. But the failure to do so should not have affected parties in future cases
because the case intake staff in each case is to review the arbitration clause without regard to
the business's status on the AAA business list.
183. In other cases, the Protocol continues to apply, but application of the Protocol is a
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such cases in the case file sample, 63 of which involved an arbitration
clause with a problematic provision. The next question is the extent to
which the AAA properly identified and responded
184 to those problematic
provisions by requiring a waiver from the business.
Initially, we examined the procedure by which the AAA determined
protocol compliance-in particular, how often businesses obtained advance
review of their arbitration clause for compliance with the Consumer Due
Process Protocol. In the vast majority of the cases, we found that AAA
review for protocol compliance occurs after a dispute arises. Very few
businesses obtained approval of their consumer arbitration clauses before a
dispute arose. Of the 1706 businesses listed as acceptable on the AAA
business list, 185 15 (or 0.9%) obtained AAA approval of their arbitration
benefits of advance review
clause before a dispute arose. 186 The potential
187
were rarely obtained in consumer cases.
We then evaluated the effectiveness of AAA post-dispute review for
protocol compliance. Of the 271 consumer cases from the case file sample
with a demand amount of $75,000 or less, 5 (or 1.8%) included an
arbitration clause that in our judgment violated the Consumer Due Process
Protocol but had not been waived by the business.' 88 Table 1 summarizes
the findings. Most cases (76.8%) arose out of clauses that did not violate
the Protocol, as noted above.' 89 Of those cases with clauses that did violate
matter for the arbitrator. See supra text accompanying notes 100-02.
184. For discussion of the possibility of selection bias due to our focus on awarded
rather than non-awarded cases, see supratext accompanying notes 177-82.
185. In our review of the documentation supporting the AAA business list, we
identified a number of businesses that were on the AAA business list but for which there
were no supporting files. This was either because the business was no longer treated as a
consumer business (70 businesses, typically involving the home construction industry) or
because the business had been added to the AAA business list before the AAA began
maintaining the supporting files (10 businesses). We excluded both types of businesses from
the analysis. Because we did not perform a similar review of many of the files of businesses
listed as acceptable, the number of such businesses (1706) may be slightly overstated. Any
such difference is immaterial here, however.
186. The AAA business list shows only businesses that obtained advance approval of
their consumer arbitration clause. It does not show businesses that sought approval but were
turned down because their clause violated the Protocol. We have no information on how
many clauses the AAA refused to approve through the advance review process.
187. We do not include as advance review cases those cases in which the party sought
and obtained AAA approval of changes to its arbitration clause in response to the AAA's
determination that a prior version of the clause violated the Protocol. Those types of cases
are relatively common, as discussed infra text accompanying notes 224-25.
188. An alternative measurement would be to calculate a false negative rate-the
number of unwaived violations (false negatives) as a percentage of all clauses with protocol
violations. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 482
(2d ed. 2000). So calculated, the false negative rate here is 5 out of 63 cases, or 7.9%.
189. See supratext accompanying note 163.
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the Protocol, the AAA obtained a waiver from the business before
administering the case in 51 cases (or 18.8%). The AAA handled the
protocol violation in 3 cases (or 1.1%) administratively. 9 ° In 4 cases (or
1.5%), the AAA administered the case without a waiver because the case
had been ordered to arbitration by a court. 91 Again, only 5 cases involved
an unwaived protocol violation. Stated otherwise, in 266 out of 271 cases
(or 98.2%), either the arbitration clause complied with the Due Process
Protocol or its non-compliance was properly identified and responded to by
the AAA.
Table 1: AAA Review of Protocol Compliance
Number of Cases
(% of Total Cases)
No protocol violation
Provision waived by business
Violation handled administratively
Case administered per court order
Unwaived violation
Total Cases (seeking $75,000 or less)

208 (76.8%)
51(18.8%)
3 (1.1 %)
4 (1.5%)
5 (1.8%)
271

We examined the case files for those five cases to determine what
happened in each case.' 92 Table 2 summarizes key characteristics of the
cases.
190. In all three cases, the AAA case intake staff identified the provision that violated
the protocol. In two cases, the provision raised a cost issue (in one, by requiring three
arbitrators for claims above $20,000, and in the other by requiring the parties to share the
costs of arbitration equally). In both cases, the AAA administered the case under the
Protocol and contacted the business separately to request it to update the clause. In the other
case, the parties had entered into two arbitration agreements, one of which provided for
AAA arbitration but included a punitive damages waiver and required the hearing to be held
at the business's location. The other clause did not mention the AAA but also did not contain
any provisions problematic under the Protocol. The AAA administered the case under the
Protocol and contacted the business separately to address the protocol issues.
191. The AAA's usual practice in such cases is to administer the case pursuant to the
Protocol, see supra text accompanying note 122, so that the unwaived violation may have
had little effect on the proceedings.
192. Mark Weidemaier raises the possibility that the consumer might waive the
protections of the protocol and permit the arbitration to go forward despite the objectionable
term. Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 662, 662 n.26. He indicates that JAMS permits such
waivers and that such a waiver is equivalent to a post-dispute agreement to arbitrate, which
see also CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54,
should be permissible. Id.;
reporter's cmts. to princ. 1 ("Assuming they have sufficient knowledge and understanding of
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Table 2: Unwaived Protocol Violations
Type of Violation

Events in Case

Case I

Location provision

Consumer did not respond to demand for arbitration

Case 2

Remedy limitation

No claim for punitive damages in case

Case 3

Remedy limitation

No claim for punitive damages in case

Case 4

Locationlimitation
provision and
remedy

AAA identified location provision; issue not resolved prior to hearing.
AAA did not identify remedy limitation; no claim for punitive
dageincs
damages in case

Case 5

Remedy limitation

Arbitrator relied on consequential damages exclusion as alternative
basis for award

In Case 1, the clause provided that the arbitration hearing was to be
held at the business's location, which was distant from the consumer's
home. 93 The consumer did not respond to the business's demand for
arbitration. 94 In Cases 2 and 3, the arbitration clause contained a punitive
damages waiver, 95 and the claimant did not seek punitive damages.
Case 4 was complicated. The arbitration clause contained two
provisions that violated the Due Process Protocol: a provision limiting the
recovery of punitive damages and a provision selecting the business's home
as the location for the arbitration hearing. The AAA did not identify the
remedy limitation. The business claimant was not seeking punitive
damages, and the consumer did not bring a counterclaim.
The AAA identified the location provision as a Protocol violation. The
business objected, arguing that the dispute was not a consumer dispute so
the Protocol did not apply. The AAA concluded that the arbitrator would
have to decide whether the Protocol applied and proceeded to appoint an
arbitrator from the state in which the business was located. Meanwhile, the
consumer filed suit in her home state challenging the enforceability of the
arbitration agreement, resulting in the arbitration being held in abeyance for
the rights they are waiving, however, Consumers may waive compliance with these
Principles after a dispute has arisen."). We found no cases in the case file sample in which
the AAA permitted a case to go forward based on a consumer waiver of the protections of
the Protocol when a provision in an arbitration clause violated the Protocol. We did find
seven cases in which the consumer voluntarily paid the business's share of the arbitration
fees when the business failed to do so. In these cases, the business's behavior rather than the
arbitration clause was problematic.
193.

See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 7.

194. The business was the claimant in the case and was seeking to recover the amount it
allegedly was owed for its services.
195.

See CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 14.

196. For a discussion of whether consumers might be discouraged from seeking
punitive damages by the presence of a punitive damages waiver, see supra text
accompanying notes 176-77.
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over a year. Eventually, the trial court held that the dispute had to be
arbitrated, and the state appellate court affirmed. Meanwhile, the consumer
changed counsel. The result was that no one raised the location issue until
shortly before the hearing was held, at which point the arbitrator deemed it
too late to reschedule the hearing.
In the award, the arbitrator did hold that the case was a consumer case
and that the Protocol applied. Relying on the Protocol, the arbitrator then
refused to enforce a "loser-pays" provision in the arbitration clause, which
would have required the consumer (who lost in the arbitration) to pay all
the business's attorneys' fees. In so holding, the arbitrator went beyond the
AAA's administrative application of Principle 6 of the Protocol under
which the
AAA does not deem loser-pays provisions to violate the
197
Protocol.

The provision in Case 5 that violated the Protocol was a remedy
limitation-a provision that precluded the recovery of consequential or
special damages. It appears that the AAA identified the violation and
handled the issue administratively,' 98 but there is no evidence that it
obtained a waiver of the provision in the arbitration proceeding itself. In the
award, the arbitrator relied on the remedy limitation to preclude the
consumer's recovery in part, finding no gross negligence by the business
that would have made the remedy limitation inapplicable. The arbitrator
also concluded that the consumer had failed to establish the business's
liability for damages in the first place, meaning the remedy limitation was
only an alternative basis for the business to prevail.
Finally, as Table 2 illustrates, the most common type of unwaived
violation was a provision limiting in some way the amount of damages the
consumer could recover in arbitration. Typically, although not always, these
provisions preclude the award of punitive damages in arbitration. There are
several possible explanations for why remedy limitations are the most
commonly overlooked protocol violation. First, the provisions vary widely
in language-ranging from a waiver of all punitive damages recovery to
some sort of cap on (but not waiver of) damages recovery. These variations
in the language of the provision may make problematic provisions more
difficult to identify. Second, it may not always be clear whether the remedy
limitation is in the arbitration clause (and hence subject to protocol
compliance review) or merely near the arbitration clause and perhaps not
subject to AAA review. Third, as discussed above, the AAA has adopted a
197.

In California, the AAA policy is to follow California law on loser-pays provisions.

See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1284.3(a) (1997) ("No neutral arbitrator or private arbitration
company shall administer a consumer arbitration under any agreement or rule requiring that
a consumer who is a party to the arbitration pay the fees and costs incurred by an opposing
party if the consumer does not prevail in the arbitration, including, but not limited to, the

fees and costs of the arbitrator, provider, organization, attorney, or witnesses.").
198. The AAA eventually classified the business as unacceptable on the AAA business
list when it failed to respond to requests to update its arbitration clause.
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broad interpretation of Principle 14 of the Consumer Due Process
Protocol. 199 Under a narrow reading of the Protocol, a remedy limitation
would be permissible so long as the limitation was lawful under the
governing law. However, the AAA applies the Protocol more broadly,
refusing to administer arbitrations arising out of clauses with remedy
limitations even if the remedy limitation would be permitted under the
governing law. If consumers or arbitrators are not aware of the broader
interpretation, they may not raise the protocol issue in cases in which the
AAA does not itself raise the issue.20 °
C. Refusal to Administer Cases
When a business refuses to waive a provision that violates the
Consumer Due Process Protocol or fails to pay its share of the arbitration
costs in an arbitration, 0 ' the AAA's policy is to refuse to administer the
case. 20 2 The result is that the case filings and fee are returned to the
claimant, and the business is classified as unacceptable on the AAA
business list. In addition, the AAA refuses to administer future consumer
cases involving the business, at least until the business provides a blanket
waiver of any provisions that violate the Protocol.
From the AAA pre-filing cases, 2°3 we identified 129 cases that the
AAA olikely had refused to administer because of protocol violations in
2007.2 Of those cases, we were able to confirm that 85 (or 65.9%) in fact

199. See AAA, FAIR PLAY, supra note 67, at 34 ("There may be circumstances where
AAA will not provide administration even if a provision may be legally enforceable, as the
standard followed by AAA may be higher than the law allows.").
200. That said, cases in which the consumer or the consumer's attorney assert a
protocol violation appeared to be rare in the case file sample, although if the issue was raised
with the arbitrator there may have been no record of it in the files we reviewed. Case 4
above was unusual in this regard. See supra text accompanying notes 196-97.
201. If the business refuses to pay its share of the arbitration fees, the consumer has the
option of paying the fees and then trying to collect them later from the business. AAA
CONSUMER RULES, supra note 96, r. C-8 ("Arbitrator Fees") ("If a party fails to pay its fees
and share of the administrative fee or the arbitrator compensation deposit, the other party
may advance such funds. The arbitrator may assess these costs in the award.") If the
consumer pays the arbitration fees, the AAA will administer the case. As noted previously,
we found seven cases in the case file sample in which the consumer paid some or all of the
business's arbitration costs when the business had failed to do so. See supra note 192. Thus,
only if the business refuses to pay its share of the fees and the consumer declines to advance
the amount of the fee will the case be rejected while in pre-filing status.
202. See supra text accompanying note 116.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.
204. We identified the cases by comparing the businesses involved in the case to those
classified as unacceptable on the AAA business list. See supra text accompanying notes
112-13.
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were protocol-related refusals to administer. 20 5 The other 44 cases (or
34.1%) likely also were protocol-related refusals to administer, but we were
unable to confirm the status of the cases definitively. 20 6 Moreover, there
may have been other refusals to administer that our methods did not
uncover. Accordingly, we can confidently say that in 2007 the AAA
refused to administer at least 85 cases, and probably at least 129 cases, due
to violations of the Consumer Due Process Protocol. We did not examine
data from other years, but we have no reason to believe the results from
2007 are atypical.
Those cases constitute 9.4% of the 1378 consumer cases closed by the
AAA during 2007.207 The total consumer cases closed in 2007 consisted of
439 cases (31.9%) that resulted in an award;20 8 544 cases (39.5%) that did
not result in an award; and 395 pre-filing cases (28.7%) that never met the
AAA's filing requirements because they settled very early on, because the
claimant failed to meet the filing requirements, or because the AAA refused
to administer the case due to protocol violations.
Various types of protocol violations gave rise to the refusals to
administer, as shown in Table 3. The AAA refused to administer 44 cases
(of 129, or 34.1%) because the business already was classified as
unacceptable on the AAA business list. The remaining cases (85 of 129, or
65.9%) involved businesses that were not already classified as
unacceptable. Of those cases, the AAA refused to administer 55 because the
business failed to pay its share of the arbitration fees and the rest (30 cases)
because the arbitration clause violated the Protocol.20 9
205. We confirmed the status of the cases by examining the AAA files documenting the
AAA business list.
206. The primary distinction between the cases we could confirm and those we could
not was whether the business was or was not already listed as unacceptable. For businesses
that were not already on the AAA business list, the AAA created a file containing the
documentation of the Protocol violation. That documentation included the name of the case,
which enabled us to verify the entry on the list of AAA pre-filing cases. For businesses that
already were listed as unacceptable, the AAA does not add additional documentation to the
files for subsequent refusals to administer. Accordingly, for those cases we were unable to
determine definitively the reason the AAA refused to administer the case. Nonetheless, it is
quite likely that the cases are ones that the AAA refused to administer under the Protocol.
207. The cases closed in 2007 consist of the cases in the AAA consumer dataset and the
AAA pre-filing cases.
208. The case file sample includes 301 of these cases, closed between April and
December 2007. The number for all of 2007 is adjusted for several exclusions from the case
file sample. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
209. The provisions violated were Principle 6 ("Reasonable Cost") (eleven cases);
Principle 14 ("Arbitral Remedies") (eight cases); Principle 7 ("Reasonably Convenient
Location") (six cases); and multiple provisions (five cases). A business's failure to pay its
share of the arbitration fees has the same effect in that case as a contract term that imposes
all costs on the consumer while permitting the consumer to recover the fees from the
business. The failure to pay differs from such a contract clause, however, because it is

TENNESSEE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 79:289

Table 3: AAA Refusals to Administer, 2007

Reason for Refusal to Administer
Business failed to pay fees
Business already classified as unacceptable
Cost issue
Remedy limitation
Location issue
Multiple violations

Total

Nube ofCae
(% of Total Cases)
55 (42.6%)
44 (34.1%)
11(8.5%)
8 (6.2%)
6 (4.7%)
5 (3.9%)

129

Although we are able to estimate with some degree of confidence the
number of cases that the AAA refused to administer for protocol violations,
we have no information on what happened to the cases afterwards. In some
cases, the dispute might nonetheless end up in AAA arbitration. If a
business subsequently resolves the protocol issue, the case may be refiled
with the AAA, or a party might obtain a court order requiring the case to be
arbitrated, which the AAA will honor.° We have no information, however,
as to whether any of the 2007 refusals to administer were refiled with the
AAA or were administered pursuant to a court order.
Another possibility is that the case was subsequently filed with another
arbitration provider. Some arbitration clauses give the claimant the choice
among several alternative arbitration providers and specify that if one
provider will not administer the case it should be filed instead with a
different provider.2 ' Again, we do not know whether any of the 2007
refusals to administer were subsequently filed with another arbitration
provider.
A third possibility is that the case might end up in court. The reported
court cases addressing how to deal with arbitrations the AAA has refused to
administer or dealing with the unavailability of the provider specified in the
arbitration agreement have produced divided results.
The difficulty for consumers in such cases is that the standard
mechanism by which the AAA enforces the Consumer Due Process
Protocol-refusing to administer cases arising out of clauses that do not
comply-may not be effective when the business is the respondent. If the
business is the claimant and the arbitration provider refuses to administer
limited to the particular consumer dispute. Accordingly, we classify the failure to pay
separately from other protocol violations.
210. See supra text accompanying note 122.
211. See infra note 222.
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the case, the business has an incentive to waive the offending provision and
to modify the clause in future contracts so that it can proceed with its claim.
However, if the business is the respondent, the business has little incentive
to do so-presumably the business does not want the claim to go forward.
If the business does not waive the protocol violation and the provider
refuses to administer the arbitration, the consumer cannot proceed with the
case in arbitration and the business might avoid being held liable.
The question then is whether the consumer claimant has any other
remedy'. The case most directly on point is Martinez v. Master Protection
Corp.,
in which the AAA refused to administer an employment
arbitration agreement because it contained provisions inconsistent with the
Employment Due Process Protocol. 213 The employee then sought to assert
his claim in court, while the business sought to have the court appoint an
arbitrator. The California Court of Appeal held that the trial court had erred
in appointing an arbitrator, stating that California arbitration law "does not
permit the trial court to choose an alternative forum when the chosen forum
refuses to hear the case. 2 14 Accordingly, because the AAA was not
available as a forum to administer the arbitration proceeding, the employee
could proceed with his claim in court.2 15
Beyond Martinez, courts have addressed this issue in several settings.
In cases in which a business respondent fails to pay its share of the required
arbitration fee, courts have generally held that the consumer or employee
claimant may bring the claim in court instead. Most courts have treated the
business's failure to pay the arbitration fee as waiving its right to
arbitration.2t 6 At least two courts have held that the business's refusal to
pay the arbitration fees was a material breach of the arbitration agreement
that permitted an employee to file suit in court 21 7' Because a business's
212. 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (alternate holding).
213. Id.at 674.
214. Id. at 675.
215. Id.
216. Garcia v. Mason Contract Prods., LLC, No. 08-23103-CIV, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92869, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 18, 2010) (finding waiver); Stowell v. Toll Bros., No.
06-cv-2103, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 287, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007) (finding waiver);
Sanderson Farms, Inc. v. Gatlin, 848 So. 2d 828, 838 (Miss. 2003) (finding waiver); Boulds
v. Dick Dean Econ. Cars, Inc., 300 S.W.3d 614, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010) (finding waiver);
see also Brandifino v. Cryptometrics, Inc., 896 N.Y.S.2d 623, 631 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010)
(giving defendant one more chance to pay before finding waiver). But see JuiceMe, LLC v.
Booster Juice LP, 730 F. Supp. 2d 1276, 1285 (D. Or. 2010) (finding waiver issue for
arbitrator to decide); Fogal v. Stature Constr., Inc., 294 S.W.3d 708, 718 (Tex. Ct. App.
2009) (finding no waiver when claimant failed to pay arbitration fees).
217. Brown v. Dillard's Inc., 430 F.3d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 2005); Sink v. Aden
Enters., Inc., 352 F.3d 1197, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). In Cox v. Ocean View Hotel Corp., 533
F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit distinguished Dillard'son the ground that the
employee in Ocean View never filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA. Id.at 1123-24.
Instead, the employee had merely written to the employer asserting a claim of sex
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failure to pay fees is the most common reason for the AAA to refuse to
administer a case,218 this line of cases usefully reinforces the AAA's private
enforcement actions.
In cases in which the AAA has refused to administer an arbitration
subject to the Health Care Due Process Protocol because the case arose out
of a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, most courts have held that that the
claimant may not litigate the case in court.' 9 Instead, the remedy is for the
court to order the case to arbitration and to appoint the arbitrator pursuant to
Section 5 of the FAA. 220 These cases are distinguishable from the first
group of cases because here the business can do nothing to remedy the
violation other than to give up the ability to arbitrate altogether. By
comparison, in the cases dealing with arbitration costs or other types of
protocol violations, the business merely has to remedy the violation to keep
the case in arbitration.
In cases in which the arbitration provider becomes unavailable for some
other reason, courts are divided on whether the case should proceed in court
or in arbitration (with the court appointing the arbitrator). 22' The central
discrimination and requesting the employer to "provide the date and time of the arbitration
hearing" to the employee's attorney. Id. at 1118.
218. See supratext accompanying note 209.
219. See Fellerman v. Am. Ret. Corp., No. 03:09-CV-803, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
43177, at *14-*16 (E.D. Va. May 3, 2010) (enforcing arbitration agreement even though
AAA would not administer arbitration arising out of pre-dispute agreement); Estate of
Eckstein v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1238 (E.D. Wash. 2009)
(same); Blue Cross Blue Shield of Ala. v. Rigas, 923 So. 2d 1077, 1092 (Ala. 2005) (same);
Mathews v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 177 P.3d 867, 872 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (same);
Estate of Perez, 23 So. 3d 741, 742-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same); New Port Richey
Med. Investors, LLC v. Stem, 14 So. 3d 1084, 1087 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (same);
Broughsville v. OHECC, LLC, No. 05CA008672, 2005 Ohio App. LEXIS 6070, at *18-*19
(Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2005) (enforcing arbitration agreement even though American
Health Lawyers Association would not administer arbitration arising out of pre-dispute
agreement); Owens v. Nat'l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 885-86 (Tenn. 2007) (enforcing
arbitration agreement even though AAA would not administer arbitration arising out of predispute agreement); Nail v. Consol. Res. Health Care Fund I, 229 P.3d 885, 889 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2010) (same); see also Oesterle v. Atria Mgmt. Co., No. 09-4010-JAR, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 60057, at *26 (D. Kan. July 14, 2009) (construing arbitration agreement as requiring
arbitration in accordance with AAA rules, but not AAA policy). But see Jackson v. Health
Net Ins. Co., No. A105220, 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9305, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct.
14, 2004) (refusing to enforce arbitration agreement specifying AHLA as arbitration
provider); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds, 14 So. 3d 695,
709 (Miss. 2009) (same); Grant v. Magnolia Manor-Greenwood, Inc., 678 S.E.2d 435, 439
(S.C. 2009) (same).
220. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
221. See Reddam v. KPMG LLP, 457 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
NASD as provider was not integral to arbitration agreement), overruled on other grounds,
Atl. Nat'l Trust LLC v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 621 F.3d 931, 940 (9th Cir. 2010); Brown v.
ITT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that when the
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inquiry is whether the identity of the provider is "integral" to the arbitration
clause. If so, the entire arbitration clause is unenforceable; if not, then the
obligation to arbitrate persists, and the court itself fills
22 the resulting gap in
the arbitration agreement by appointing the arbitrator.
chosen forum is unavailable, the arbitration agreement is not void unless the chosen forum
"was an integral part of the agreement to arbitrate"); In re Salomon, Inc. S'holders'
Derivative Litig., 68 F.3d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 1995) ("None of these cases, however, stands for
the proposition that district courts may use § 5 to circumvent the parties' designation of an
exclusive arbitral forum.").
Many of these cases in recent years have involved arbitration clauses that specified
the National Arbitration Forum as the arbitration provider. Courts are divided on whether the
unavailability of the NAF, see supra note 53, renders the arbitration agreement
unenforceable. Compare Ranzy v. Tijerina, No. 10-20251, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 17872, at
*4-*5 (5th Cir. Aug. 25, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (holding arbitration agreement
unenforceable because NAF integral to agreement); Khan v. Dell, Inc., No. 09-3703, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85042, at *12 (D.N.J. Aug. 18, 2010) (same); Carideo v. Dell, Inc., No.
C06-1772JLR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104600, at *17-*18 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2009)
(same); Carr v. Gateway, Inc., 944 N.E.2d 327, 337 (I11.2011) (finding that arbitration
agreement is unenforceable because "the designation of the NAF as the arbitral forum is
integral to the agreement"); Stewart v. GGNSC-Canonsburg, L.P., 9 A.3d 215, 219 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2010) ("The trial court's legal conclusion that the Agreement was unenforceable
due to the NAF's unavailability is supported by a majority of the decisions that have
analyzed language similar to that in the Agreement. In sum, these cases concluded that the
NAF's participation in the arbitration process was an 'integral part' of the agreement to
arbitrate."), with Wilson v. Dell Fin. Servs., No. 5:09-cv-00483, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10809, at *7-*8 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 8, 2010) (finding that arbitration agreement is enforceable
because NAF is not integral to agreement); Miller v. Dell Fin. Servs., No. 5:08-cv-0 1184,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9462, at *7-*8 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 4, 2010) (same); Jones v. GGNSC
Pierre LLC, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (D. S.D. Feb. 3, 2010) (same); Levy v. Cain,
Watters & Assocs., No. 2:09-cv-723, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9537, at *15-*16 (S.D. Ohio
Jan. 15, 2010) (same); Adler v. Dell Inc., No. 08-cv-13170, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112204,
at *10-* 1I (E.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2009) (same); see also In re Checking Acct. Overdraft
Litig., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1301 (S.D. Fla. May 25, 2010) (holding NAF not integral when
arbitration agreement provides for court to appoint provider); Clerk v. First Bank of Del.,
735 F. Supp. 2d 170, 180 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 2010) (holding NAF not integral when
arbitration agreement gave choice of arbitration providers); Jackson v. Payday Loan Store of
Ill., Inc., No. 09 C 4189, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25266, at *10 (N.D. I11.Mar. 17, 2010)
(same); Smith v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 09cv1076, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
115767, at *22 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009) (holding NAF not integral when arbitration
agreement permitted choice of additional provider on consent of other party).
222. Some consumer arbitration clauses set out a choice of arbitration providers, and
some provide to the effect that "no arbitration may be administered by any administrator that
has any formal or informal policy, rule or procedure that is inconsistent with or purports to
override the terms of this section." See, e.g., Community Am. Credit Union, Credit Card
Agreement at para. 11, available at http://www.cacu.com/ancillary/CU-108_Credit%20
Card%20Agrmt.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2011). The latter type of provision appears directed
at provider policies addressing class arbitration waivers rather than due process protocols.
See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Is JAMS in a Jam Over Its PolicyRegarding Class
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The fourth and final possibility is that the case may end up not being
brought at all when the AAA refuses to administer it. We have no data on
how frequently cases end up being dropped after the AAA refuses to
administer the arbitration.
Overall, then, we find that in enforcing the Consumer Due Process
Protocol, the AAA refused to administer at least 85 consumer cases, and
likely 129 consumer cases, amounting to 9.4% of its consumer caseload in
2007. We have no information, however, on what happened to those cases
after the AAA refused to administer them.
D. Business Responses to AAA Protocol ComplianceReview
This Section addresses how businesses respond to the AAA's
enforcement of the Due Process Protocol. Of course, most cases in the case
file sample do not present a protocol violation in the first place-most
businesses comply with the protocol in advance of AAA review. Thus, as
explained above, 76.6% of the cases in the case file sample contained no
provision that violated the Protocol as applied by the AAA. Similarly, the
number of businesses classified as "acceptable" on the AAA business list
(i.e., the 1706 businesses for which it will administer consumer arbitrations)
is more than two-and-one-half times as large as the number of businesses
(647) classified as "unacceptable. 223
One possibility is that the business might respond by waiving the
violation in the pending case or revising the clause for future cases.224 Since
the AAA began reviewing consumer clauses for protocol violations, over
150 businesses have updated their arbitration clauses to remove a protocol
violation or have waived such provisions for future cases, as shown in

Action Waivers in Consumer Arbitration Agreements?, 61 Bus. LAW. 923 (2006).
Nonetheless, the provision would make it difficult for a court to permit the consumer to file
suit in court when a provider relies on a due process protocol (which presumably would
qualify as a "formal or informal policy") to refuse to administer a case, unless the court were
to find the provision unconscionable as an attempt to avoid the due process protocols or
otherwise unenforceable.
223. As discussed above, while we examined occasional files of businesses classified as
acceptable on the AAA business list, we did not subject those businesses to the same
comprehensive review as those classified as unacceptable. As a result, there may be
businesses so classified that no longer arbitrate using the AAA's consumer arbitration rules.
Conversely, however, AAA case intake staff may be less likely to make sure that acceptable
businesses are added to the AAA business list than unacceptable businesses; clauses from
acceptable businesses need to be reviewed again each time the business is involved in a
consumer arbitration in any event. Thus, the number of businesses that have been involved
in AAA consumer arbitrations with clauses that fully comply with the protocol may be either
more or less than 1706, although likely not materially so in either direction.
224. As between the two, revising the clause would seem preferable, as it reduces the
possibility consumers might not file a claim and thus not learn of the waiver.
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Table 4.225 In 5 of those cases, the business waived future violations but
then indicated it would remove the AAA from its arbitration clause. In one
case the business waived future violations and then informed the AAA it
was eliminating its arbitration clause altogether.
By far the most common protocol issue in these cases involved
arbitration costs. Sixty of the clauses presented only cost issues, and a
number more raised cost issues together with other protocol violations.226
Eliminating provisions raising cost issues either by waiver or updating the
clause would likely benefit all consumers who arbitrate against the
company under the revised clause. Otherwise, the consumer would either
have to pay a larger share of the arbitration costs or contribute toward the
fees of three arbitrators instead of one. In Mark Weidemaier's words, "these
are cases in which the due process rules yield a clear benefit to individual
claimants. 227 By comparison, not every consumer will benefit from the
elimination of a remedy limitation or a location provision (requiring the
hearing to be held at a distant location); not every consumer will have a
claim for punitive damages; and not every consumer will want an in-person
hearing. Nonetheless, for those consumers who do, the AAA's protocol
review process again has clear benefits.
Table 4: Business Responses to AAA Protocol Compliance,
On Business List As "Acceptable"
Businss
BusiessRespnseCases

RTotal

No Response Necessary
Updated Clause
Waived Violation for Future Cases
Waiver and Removed AAA
Waiver and Removed Arbitration
Sought Advance Review

1539
95
51
5
1
15

Total "Acceptable" Businesses

1706

A second possibility is that the business might respond by doing
nothing-either not participating in the case or not updating its clause for
225. Businesses may have an incentive to waive violations and change their clause to
comply with the Due Process Protocol because of the "legitimacy" provided by arbitrating

with a well-respected arbitration provider. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
226. See infra app. 1.
227. Weidemaier, supra note 13, at 670 (distinguishing between cases in which "the
offending term serves no function" and 'meaningful' waivers" of provisions that violate the
protocols).
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future cases. A number of businesses simply fail to pay their share of
arbitration fees in a case or do not respond to requests by the AAA to waive
any problematic provisions under the Protocol. As shown in Table 5, 358
businesses are classified as unacceptable on the AAA business list for these
reasons. Most commonly, the business failed or refused to pay its share of
arbitration costs even though its arbitration clause fully complied with the
Protocol. Somewhat less commonly, the business failed to pay arbitration
fees and to waive a problematic provision under the Protocol as well.22 8
Table 5: Business Responses to AAA Protocol Compliance,
On Business List As "Unacceptable"
: :: !.::
: : :, :
i ".',.Total
Cases
Response
Business
Did Not Respond to Case Initiation

358

Did Not Respond to AAA Contact

201

Refused to Pay, Update Clause, or Waive

61

Notified Removing AAA

13

Removing Arbitration Clause

1

Out of Business

10

Unable to Locate

3

Total "Unacceptable" Businesses

i

647

The AAA classified another 201 businesses as unacceptable because
they did not respond to a subsequent contact by the AAA seeking to have
the business update its arbitration clause to remove a protocol violation. An
additional 61 businesses refused to comply with the protocol, either by
refusing to pay their share of arbitration fees or 22by9 refusing to waive a
protocol violation or update their arbitration clause.
A third possibility is that the business might remove the arbitration
clause from its consumer contracts altogether or replace the AAA with a
different arbitration provider. To the extent businesses respond to AAA
228. The types of provisions that businesses most commonly refused to waive or
change were provisions addressing arbitration costs, specifying the location of the arbitration
hearing, and limiting remedies. See infra app. 2.
229. Although we attempted to follow the classification scheme in the AAA business
list by distinguishing between cases in which the business did not respond and cases in
which the business refused to comply, one should not place too much significance on these
differing classifications. As a practical matter, the result is the same in both types of cases:
the business does not pay its share of fees or the problematic provision remains.
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protocol review by switching to other arbitration providers or by avoiding
the AAA altogether, the Consumer Due Process Protocol becomes less
effective as a means of private regulation.
We have limited ability to determine the extent to which companies in
fact switched to other arbitration providers or removed arbitration clauses
from their consumer contracts. A business that changes its clause in either
of these ways presumably would no longer appear in the case file sample,
leaving us unable to determine whether their failure to appear was due to
their switching arbitration providers or whether they simply did not have
any disputes
with consumers proceed to arbitration during the period we
studied.*3°
The AAA does record on the AAA business list those businesses that
inform the AAA that they have removed or will be removing the AAA (or
arbitration in general) from their dispute resolution clause. The number of
such businesses is quite small. Of the 647 businesses listed on the AAA
business list as unacceptable, 13 (or 2.0%) informed the AAA that they had
removed or would be removing the AAA from their clause, and 1 (or
0.15%) informed the AAA that its dispute resolution clause no longer
provided for arbitration. Another 5 businesses (of 1706, or 0.3%) listed as
acceptable waived any protocol violations but then informed the AAA that
they would no longer provide for AAA arbitration in their dispute
resolution clause. One business (or 0.05%) listed as acceptable waived any
protocol violations but then removed arbitration altogether from its
consumer contracts. Overall, then, 18 businesses (or 0.8%) of those on the
AAA business list informed the AAA that they would no longer provide for
AAA arbitration, and 2 businesses (or 0.08%) removed their arbitration
clause altogether.
Of course not all businesses that switch dispute resolution providers (or
remove arbitration altogether from their contract) necessarily inform the
AAA that they are doing so. Any number of businesses classified as
unacceptable by the AAA might have changed their contracts without
informing the AAA.
Another way to identify businesses that switch away from the AAA is
to look at data from other arbitration providers. California law requires
arbitration providers to disclose basic information about their consumer
arbitration cases, including the name of the business party. 23I As others
have noted, the disclosure documents are not always in the most useful
format for researchers.2 32 But Public Citizen has compiled data from the
230. The remaining categories shown in Table 5 are that the business went "out of
business" (ten cases) or that the AAA was unable to locate the business (three cases).
231. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.96.
232. CAL. DISPUTE RESOLUTION INST., CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN
CALIFORNIA: A REVIEW OF WEBSITE DATA POSTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 1281.96 OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 27 (Aug. 2004) ("Many providers posted required information on
their websites. However, a number of data points were not provided. Some providers,
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National Arbitration Forum's ("NAF's") California disclosures into a
spreadsheet available on Public Citizen's website.233 We matched the
businesses that brought NAF arbitrations in California against the AAA's
list of unacceptable businesses to try to identify businesses that might have
switched from the AAA to NAF.
Of the 647 businesses classified as unacceptable on the AAA business
list, we found 5 (or 0.8%) that were subsequently listed as arbitrating cases
using the NAF during the period covered. The combined caseload of those
businesses before the NAF was small; they were not major contributors to
the NAF caseload.234 Interestingly, 3 of the 5 businesses were ones that had
informed the AAA that they would no longer use AAA arbitration in future
cases. Two businesses classified by the AAA as unacceptable that showed
up in the NAF cases had not already informed the AAA they were
switching providers. One of those two had appeared before the AAA
because of a claim it had acquired from another business arising out of a
contract providing for AAA arbitration.
The NAF data have various limitations. First, obviously they only
involve arbitrations administered by the NAF. If the business switched from
the AAA to a provider other than the NAF,it would not aJpear in the NAF
data. Second, the disclosures are limited to California.
To the extent
businesses switching from AAA arbitration do not operate in California or
do not have disputes with California customers, they would not appear in
the NAF data. That said, one might expect that a major business operating
however, posted data that resulted in inconsistent, incomplete and/or ambiguous data.").
233. See NAF, CALIFORNIA DATA JAN. 2003 TO MAR. 2007, available at
www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/arbitration/NAFCalifomia.xls (last visited Apr. 22, 2011).
Public Citizen describes the spreadsheet as follows:
This spreadsheet consists of the information on 33,948 National Arbitration Forum
cases conducted in California between Jan. 1, 2003 and Mar. 31, 2007. It was
compiled from quarterly reports that the National Arbitration Forum posted in a
difficult-to-find place on its Web site in Adobe Systems' Portable Document
Format (PDF). Public Citizen converted them to an Excel spreadsheet so
California residents and others interested in binding mandatory arbitration may do
their own analysis of NAF arbitrations in California and of the records of NAF
arbitrators.
THE ARBITRATION TRAP: How CREDIT CARD COMPANIES ENSNARE
http://www.citizen.org/publications/publicationredirect.cfm?ID=7545
(last
visited Apr. 22, 2011).
234. To avoid the possibility of identifying any of the businesses, we do not quantify
the percentage of the NAF caseload provided by the businesses, although it was small. We
can say that neither MNBA Bank nor Banc One-which with their assignees and successors
accounted for a substantial majority of the NAF caseload in the Public Citizen spreadsheetwas one of the businesses that switched from the AAA to the NAF.
235. See supra text accompanying note 230.

PUBLIC CITIZEN,
CONSUMERS,
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nationally would have at least one case in California during the period
covered by the NAF disclosures. Third, we do not have access to the
arbitration clauses giving rise to the NAF arbitrations. Some arbitration
clauses permit the claimant to choose either the AAA or the NAF (or
sometimes JAMS) to administer their arbitration. 36 It might be that the
arbitrations before the NAF were brought under such clauses rather than
clauses that removed the AAA as provider. Thus, the mere fact that the
business appears both on the AAA business list and in the NAF spreadsheet
does not necessarily mean that the business is one that switched from the
AAA. Subject to those caveats, however, we find little evidence that
businesses switched from the AAA to the NAF as an alternative arbitration
provider.237
VII. CONCLUSIONS

A. EmpiricalFindings
Our central empirical findings on the enforcement of the AAA
Consumer Due Process Protocol are as follows:
"

*

*

In the case file sample of AAA consumer arbitrations, the majority
of consumer arbitration clauses (229 of 299, or 76.6%) fully
complied with the Consumer Due Process Protocol as applied by
the AAA. We found no statistically significant difference in how
frequently clauses violated the Protocol between cases seeking
$75,000 or less (which were subject to AAA protocol compliance
review) and cases seeking over $75,000 (which were not).
The AAA's review of arbitration clauses for protocol compliance
appears to be effective at identifying and responding to those
clauses with protocol violations. Of the 271 cases in the case file
sample subject to the AAA's protocol compliance review, 5 (or
1.8%) included an arbitration clause with an unwaived violation of
the Consumer Due Process Protocol. Stated otherwise, in 266 out of
271 cases (or 98.2%), either the arbitration clause complied with
the Due Process Protocol or the AAA properly identified and
responded to the clause's non-compliance.
In the time period studied, the AAA refused to administer at least
85 consumer cases, and likely at least 129 consumer cases (or 9.4%

236. Drahozal & Rutledge, supra note 7, at 1126 tbl.3.
237. See Martin H. Malin, Due Process in Employment Arbitration: The State of the
Law and the Need for Self-Regulation, 11 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 363, 399 (2007) ("To
the extent those rogue arbitration agencies and opportunistic employers represent a
significant share of the market, they could place competitive pressure on AAA and JAMS to
deviate from their rules and policies. There are reasons to believe that this is not a
widespread problem.").
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of its total consumer caseload), because the business failed to
comply with the Consumer Due Process Protocol. The most
common reason for refusing to administer a case (55 of 129 cases,
or 42.6%) was the business's failure to pay its share of the costs of
arbitration rather than any problematic provision in the arbitration
clause.
In response to AAA protocol compliance review, over 150
businesses have either waived problematic provisions or revised
arbitration clauses to remove provisions that violated the Consumer
Due Process Protocol. Those businesses are in addition to over
1550 businesses with arbitration clauses that did not violate the
Protocol. By comparison, the AAA has identified 647 businesses
for which it will refuse to administer arbitrations. The most
common reason (358 of 647, or 55.3%) for the AAA to refuse to
administer consumer arbitrations for a business is the business's
failure to pay its share of the arbitration costs.
B. Policy Implications

Our findings support the proposition that private regulation by the AAA
complements existing public regulation of the fairness of consumer
arbitration clauses. Our evidence indicates that the AAA effectively reviews
arbitration clauses for protocol compliance and appropriately responds to
clauses that do not comply. A number of businesses have responded to
AAA compliance efforts by changing their arbitration clauses to comply
with the Protocol. Any consideration of the need for additional public
regulation should take into account such private regulation of consumer
arbitration.
To be clear, we examined only the AAA's enforcement of the
Consumer Due Process Protocol and business responses to those
enforcement actions. We did not examine the AAA's enforcement of the
Employment Due Process Protocol (or other due process protocols) or
Nor does this study
business responses to those enforcement actions.
238. As noted above, the AAA's procedures for enforcing the Employment Due
Process Protocol differ from its consumer procedures. See supra text accompanying notes
103-09. In addition, employers may have stronger incentives to comply with AAA
enforcement measures due to their more frequent repeat dealings with employees than with
individual consumers. Drahozal, supra note 38, at 768-69. Anecdotal reports are consistent
with this supposition. See Eric Tuchmann, The Arbitration Fairness Act, Analyzed:
International Dispute Negotiation Podcast 62, minute 14:05 (Feb. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/455/IDN-62--TheArbitration-Faimess-Act-Analyzed.aspx ("So if we tell them there's a problem with it in the
employment context, they're very likely to welcome our suggestions and make the changes
that we're asking for. The consumer situation is a little bit different. Those are much more
likely to be one-off disputes with customers.... The results are a little bit more mixed in the
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address the enforcement of due process protocols by other arbitration
providers or examine whether smaller arbitration providers even have
adopted due process protocols. Thus, nothing we say here should be taken
as asserting that private regulation alone-with no public regulatory
backstop, such as through court oversight-suffices to ensure the fairness
of consumer arbitration proceedings.
Indeed, courts and policymakers could consider ways to reinforce the
AAA's enforcement of the Consumer Due Process Protocol. For example,
courts could look more skeptically on arbitration clauses that do not choose
a reputable arbitration provider.23 In addition, courts could give businesses
additional incentive to waive violations of the Protocol (or to pay their
share of arbitration fees) by making clear that the consumer can bring the
case in court if the business does not comply with the Protocol. The
rationale could be that the identity of the provider was "material" to the
agreement to arbitrate; hence, the inability to arbitrate before the AAA
would result in invalidation of the entire arbitration clause.24 ° Congress,
state legislatures, and the courts also might consider ways to extend the
protections of the Consumer (and Employment) Due Process Protocols to
arbitration clauses that do not provide for AAA arbitration.
Although our evidence indicates that the AAA effectively reviews
clauses for protocol compliance, that review process could nonetheless be
improved in several ways. First, the process of reviewing consumer clauses
might be centralized in a single person, as it is for the Employment Due
Process Protocol. Centralization might reduce further the number of
unwaived protocol violations, although at some resource cost to the AAA.
Second, the AAA might provide additional training for case intake staff,
particularly on how to identify problematic remedy limitations, the most
commonly overlooked type of violation. Third, the AAA might publish its
standards for reviewing clauses for protocol compliance. Publication would
give businesses better information on what provisions are problematic and
could enlist consumer claimants and their attorneys in enforcement of the
Protocol. Finally, the AAA might give more prominent notice of the
availability of advance review, such as by incorporating advance review
into its Consumer Arbitration Rules.

consumer context with organizations' willingness to comply with our requests.").
239. Drahozal, supra note 38, at 769-70, 770 n.476.
240. Perhaps an arbitration clause that permits a business to choose a different provider
when the provider refuses to administer a case because of protocol violations, see supra note
222, could be subject to challenge as unconscionable, for example.
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APPENDIX 1. BUSINESS RESPONSES TO AAA PROTOCOL COMPLIANCE, ON

THE AAA BUSINESS LIST AS "ACCEPTABLE"
Business
Response

.
..
Protocol ssues

. ..

Nm

No Response Necessary
No issues
Total No Response Necessary

1539

Updated Clause
Cost issue
Location issue
Remedy limitation
Cost issue and location issue
Cost issue and remedy limitation
Others
Unspecified
Total Updated Clause

44
9
16
3
13
9
1

Waived Violation for Future Cases
Cost issue
Location issue
Remedy limitation
Cost issue and location issue
Cost issue and remedy limitation
Unpaid fees
Others
Unspecified
Total Waived Violation for Future Cases

16
4
5
2
7
9
3
5

Waiver and Removed AAA
Cost Issue
Remedy Limitation

1539

95

51
4
1

5

Total Waiver and Removed AAA
Waiver and Removed Arbitration
Hearing Issue

TotaIul

1

Total Waiver and Removed Arbitration
Sought Advance Review
Approved as submitted
Approved after revision (various protocol issues)
Total Sought Advance Review

Grand Total "Acceptable" Businesses

14

1
15
1706
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APPENDIX 2. BuSINESs RESPONSES TO AAA PROTOCOL COMPLIANCE, ON
THE AAA BUSINESS LIST AS "UNACCEPTABLE"
Bune
Repse Protocol Iueo
Did Not Respond to Case Initiation
Unpaid fees
Cost issue
Location issue
Remedy limitation
Cost issue and location issue
Cost issue and remedy limitation
Cost issue and arbitrator selection issue
Location issue and remedy limitation
Other
Unspecified
Total Did Not Respond to Case Initiation
Did Not Respond to AAA Contact
Cost issue
Location issue
Remedy limitation
Cost issue and location issue
Cost issue and remedy limitation
Cost issue and arbitrator selection issue
Location issue and remedy limitation
Other
Unspecified
Did not examine
Total Did Not Respond to AAA Contact
Refused to Pay
Unpaid fees
Unpaid fees and cost issue
Refused to Update Clause
Remedy limitation
Refused to Waive
Cost issue
Location issue
Remedy limitation
Cost issue and remedy limitation
Other
Unspecified
Total Refusals
Removing AAA
Unpaid fees
Cost issue
Remedy limitation
Cost issue and remedy limitation
Unspecified
Total Removing AAA
Removing Arbitration Clause
Remedy limitation
Total Removing Arbitration Clause
Out of Business
Unavailable
Total Out of Business
Unable to Locate
Unavailable
Total Unable to Locate
Grand Total "Unacceptable" Businesses

Nnuber

~S

Toa
Ce

252
41
20
15
2
6
5
3
10
4
358
30
12
23
I
4
2
2
5
2
120
201
29
2
2
9
6
9
2
1
1
61
3
6
2
1
1
13

10
10
3
3
647
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APPENDIX 3. OTHER EMPIRICAL ISSUES

Our data also permit us to address several other issues related to the
Due Process Protocols. First, to what extent do consumer arbitrations arise
out of post-dispute versus pre-dispute agreements? Second, how common
are class arbitration waivers-which are not addressed by the Protocols-in
consumer arbitration agreements? Third, how did the AAA handle cases in
the case file sample involving the health care industry that might be subject
to the Health Care Due Process Protocol?
A. Pre-Disputev. Post-DisputeAgreements
The Consumer Due Process Protocol does not bar enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements, although the matter was controversial
among the drafters of the Protocol. 24 Thus, it is not surprising that
arbitrations arising from pre-dispute clauses are common in the case file
sample. Indeed, virtually all (290, or 96.3%) of the 301 cases in the case file
sample arose out of pre-dispute agreements, while only 11 (or 3.7%) arose
out of post-dispute agreements to arbitrate.242 These results are consistent
with prior studies of employment and international arbitration.24 3
The more interesting question is what, if anything, can be learned from
the dramatically greater number of arbitrations arising from pre-dispute as
opposed to post-dispute agreements. A common argument by critics of predispute consumer arbitration agreements is that if arbitration were fair,
parties would agree to it post-dispute even if they could not agree to it predispute. 244 The usual response is that parties are unlikely to agree post241. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86. By comparison, the Health Care Due
Process Protocol does preclude enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements "in cases
involving patients." HEALTH CARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 3 ("In
disputes involving patients, binding forms of dispute resolution should be used only where
the parties agree to do so after a dispute arises.").
242. Although we treated two of the clauses as missing for purposes of evaluating AAA
protocol compliance review, see supra text accompanying notes 147-48, those clauses
plainly were pre-dispute clauses, and we treat them as such here, even though we could not
determine all of the provisions in the clause.
243. Stephen R. Bond, How to Draft an Arbitration Clause (Revisited), 1(2) ICC INT'L
CT. ARB. BULL. 14 (1990), reprinted in CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL & RICHARD W.
NAIMARK, TOwARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL

RESEARCH 65, 67 (2005) ("Of the cases submitted to the ICC Court, only four [of 237] in
1987 and six [of 215] in 1989 resulted from a compromis, that is, an agreement to submit an
already-existing dispute to arbitration."); Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, into the
Fire: The Feasibility of Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM.

MITCHELL L. REv. 313, 319 (2003) ("AAA found only 6% (69/1148) of their 2001
employment arbitrations were the result of post-dispute agreements. In 2002, the frequency
of post-dispute agreements was even lower, 2.6% (29/1124).").
244.

See, e.g., Charles Knapp, Common Sense and ContractsSymposium: The Gateway
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dispute to arbitrate, even if arbitration would make them both better off ex
ante. Once parties know of their claim, they often will be unable to agree to
arbitration, either because of limitations on the bargaining process 245 or
because an uncertainty that would have permitted the parties to make a
beneficial bargain earlier has been resolved. 4 6
While our results do show that arbitrations arising out of post-dispute
agreements to arbitrate are rare, they do not resolve the disagreement over
the implications of that rarity. If pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
consumer disputes are made unenforceable, it seems likely that the number
of consumer arbitration proceedings would decline dramatically. But our
data provide no definitive evidence on the reason for that decline.
B. Use of Class Arbitration Waivers
One criticism of the Consumer Due Process Protocol is that it is
underinclusive-it does not include all provisions in arbitration clauses that
some see as unfavorable to consumers. 247 The most frequently litigated
provision, and one central to the policy debate over consumer arbitration, is
the class arbitration waiver.
The existing empirical evidence is mixed on how frequently consumer
arbitration clauses include class arbitration waivers. Eisenberg, Miller, and
Sherwin found that in a sample of contracts from consumer financial
services companies and telecommunications companies,24 8 20 of 26 (or
Thread-AALS ContractsListserv, 16 TouRo L. REV. 1147, 1173 (2000) ("[I]f arbitration is
so economically sound for everybody, then let the consumer be persuaded 'once the dispute
has arisen' that arbitration is in her best interests too.").
245. Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Costs and Contingent Fee Contracts, 59
VAND. L. REv. 729, 746-47 (2006).
246. See, e.g., Peter B. Rutledge, Who Can Be Against Fairness?The Case Against the
Arbitration FairnessAct, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 267, 278-80 (2008); Stephen J.
Ware, The Case for Enforcing Adhesive Arbitration Agreements-with Particular
Considerationof Class Actions andArbitration Fees, 5 J. AM. ARB. 251, 262--64 (2006).
247. Bales, supra note 75, at 188 ("[One] issue is the enforceability of arbitration
clauses that forbid employees from bringing claims as an arbitral class action."); Malin,
supra note 237, at 402 ("[T]he neutral community has failed to address the common practice
in employer-imposed arbitration systems that prohibit not only class actions but also joinder
of claims of even two individuals."); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Mandating Minimum Quality in
Mass Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REv. 383, 424 (2008) ("A more substantive failing of the
Employment Protocol and similar ventures is that they either do not address remedial issues
such as the availability of class actions or expressly exclude standard litigation remedies
from mass arbitration."); Stemlight, supra note 12, at 175 ("By contrast [to the Health Care
Protocol], the Consumer Protocol neither bans mandatory arbitration nor clauses that would
eliminate consumers' rights to proceed in class actions.").
248. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration's Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 881-82 (2008) (describing their sample as
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76.9%) consumer contracts included arbitration clauses 249 and all 20 of the
contracts with arbitration clauses included class arbitration waivers.250
Based on this "fairly narrow" sample, 25' they concluded:
[A]part from the role of arbitration clauses in shoring up the validity of
class action waivers, it is not clear why consumer arbitration would appeal
to companies. .

.

. [F]rom the perspective of corporate self-interest,

concern over class actions remains the most likely explanation
for the
252
prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer agreements.
By contrast, in end user license agreements (EULAs) for computer
software, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler found almost no use of arbitration
clauses and no use of class arbitration waivers.2 53 Her conclusions are in
stark contrast to those of Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin:
Although much analysis remains to be done, these results immediately
cast doubt on casual claims that sellers' rampant use of choice of forum
and arbitration clauses deprive buyers of their day in court, or that sellers
are shielding themselves from 2liability
by making it impossible for buyers
54
to aggregate low-value claims.
An older study found only limited use of class arbitration waivers in a
variety of consumer contracts. Linda Demaine and Deborah Hensler
examined dispute resolution clauses in a sample of contracts from
businesses that an average consumer "was most likely to patronize."'255 Of
the 161 contracts they examined, 57 (or 35.4%) included an arbitration
consisting of the following types of companies (with the number of such companies in
parentheses): "Telecommunications (7); Cable services (CATV, Internet, phone) (5);

Securities services (4); Commercial banks (3); Retail credit card issuers (2); and Financial
credit company (1)").

249. Id. at 882-83.
250. Id. at 884.
251. Id. at 891 ("Our study is limited to a fairly narrow range of industries. As
described above, only six major groups appear in our sample.").
252. Id. at 894.
253. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado
about Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 51 (Omri
Ben-Shahar ed. 2007) ("Not a single EULA out of 597 includes a class-action waiver."). Of
the consumer EULAs she studied, only 15 of 259 (or 5.8%) included an arbitration clause.
Id. at 52.
254.

Id.

255. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
PredisputeArbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 58-59 (2004). The businesses were from the following types of industries:
"housing and home services," "retail services," "transportation," "health," "food and
entertainment," "travel," "financial," and "other." Id. For a more detailed listing of the types
of businesses they studied, see id. tbl. 1.
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clause.2 56 The use of arbitration clauses varied widely across their industry
groups, from a high of 69.2% in financial businesses to none in food and
entertainment businesses .2 57 They also found that a minority (30.8%) of the
arbitration clauses included class arbitration waivers, but they did not
provide a breakdown by industry type.25 8 Demaine and Hensler collected
their data in 2001,259 prior to the Supreme Court's decision Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (which greatly expanded the use of class
arbitration), so their results do not provide any insight into the post-Bazzle
use of class arbitration waivers.
We also find varied use of class arbitration waivers in consumer
contracts giving rise to AAA consumer arbitrations in 2007. Overall, of the
clauses we examined in the case file sample, 109 of 299 (or 36.5%)
included class arbitration waivers. The use of class arbitration waivers
varied widely across contract types, as shown in Figure 3. Consistent with
Eisenberg, Miller, and Sherwin, we found that all cases involving cell
phone companies (5 of 5, or 100.0%) and all cases involving credit card
issuers (26 of 26, or 100.0%) arose out of arbitration clauses with class
arbitration waivers. By comparison, just over half of cases arising out of car
sale contracts (34 of 64, or 53.1%) and contracts with homebuilders (11 of
17, or 64.7%) included class arbitration waivers. Meanwhile, none of the
cases arising out of insurance contracts or real estate brokerage agreements
included class arbitration waivers. 260 Thus, while some types of consumer
contracts in the case file sample commonly included class arbitration
waivers, other types did not.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 63-64 tbl. 2.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 60.
We should note that almost all of the insurance cases involved a single insurer.
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Figure3:
Use of ClassArbitration Waiversby Typeof Contract
(Cases=161)
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One caveat to these findings is that the case file sample of arbitration
clauses is limited to those giving rise to AAA consumer arbitrations closed
in 2007. Clauses selecting other providers may differ in how frequently
they include class arbitration waivers.26 ' Moreover, many of those
arbitrations (180 of 301, or 59.8%) were filed in 2007, although a number
were filed earlier. We do not have data on the date on which the arbitration
agreements giving rise to those arbitrations were entered. For some types of
contracts, such as car sales agreements, one would expect a dispute to arise
relatively soon after the sales contract was signed. But for others, there may
have been a time lag between the time when the parties entered the
arbitration agreement and when the case arising out of the arbitration
agreement was closed. Therefore, we cannot exclude the possibility that the
arbitration clauses we examined might have changed subsequently to
include class arbitration waivers.
That said, the evidence suggests that many consumer arbitration clauses
may not include class arbitration waivers. Studies that have found
widespread use of class arbitration waivers focused on types of businesses
that most commonly used class arbitration waivers. The evidence here

261. The AAA has promulgated rules governing the administration of class arbitrations
and had an extensive class arbitration docket at the time of this study. See AM. ARBIrRATION
Ass'N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS (EFFECTIVE OCT. 8, 2003),
availableat http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commercial/documents/
document/mdaw/mdax/-edisp/adrstg_004129.pdf. We do not know whether the availability
of class arbitration before the AAA made it less likely or more likely that arbitration clauses
specifying the AAA would include class arbitration waivers.
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suggests that those businesses may not be representative of all the
businesses that include arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.
C. Health Care Cases
Although this Article focuses on the Consumer Due Process Protocol,
the case file sample provides a limited opportunity to consider the AAA's
application of the Health Care Due Process Protocol as well. As discussed
above, unlike the other due process protocols, the Health Care Due Process
Protocol provides that "[i]n disputes involving patients, binding forms of
dispute resolution should be used only where the parties agree to do so after
a dispute arises. 262 In its Healthcare Policy Statement, the AAA has
indicated that it would not administer "cases involving individual patients"
unless the parties agreed to arbitrate after the dispute arose.263 The AAA
distinguishes cases involving a "patient undergoing health care treatment"
from "other situations involving an individual" in which the AAA "will
continue to administer pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate. ' 2 6 Thus, under
the AAA's Healthcare Policy Statement, if the dispute involves treatment of
the patient, a post-dispute arbitration agreement is necessary; but for other
disputes, such as those involving the payment of money, the AAA will still
administer pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even in the health care field.
The case file sample included seven health care-related cases. Three of
the cases were disputes between a health insurance company and its
insured. In two cases, the claimant sought coverage of treatment that had
not yet been provided. In both of those cases, the parties entered into a postdispute arbitration agreement. In the other case, the claimant sought
coverage for treatment that already had been provided; in other words, the
dispute was over reimbursement of money to the consumer. The parties
arbitrated that case pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement.
The other four health care-related cases were brought by or against
nursing homes. In one case, a consumer sought damages against the nursing
home for negligence in the care it provided. In that case, the parties entered
into a post-dispute arbitration agreement. One of the other claims was a
claim by a consumer for overcharges against the nursing home. The other
two cases were collection actions brought by the nursing home against the
patient or a family member. All three of those cases were brought pursuant
to pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
Overall, then, the AAA's administration of the small number health
care cases in the case file sample seems to have followed the line it draws

262. HEALTH CARE DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL, supra note 54, princ. 3.
263. AM. ARBITRATION Ass'N, HEALTHCARE POLICY STATEMENT (EFFECTIVE JAN. 1,
2003), availableat http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?url=/cs/groups/commerciaV
documents/document/mdaw/mdaz/-edisp/adrstg_004122.pdf
264. Id.

352

TENNESSEE LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 79:289

between cases involving treatment of a patient and cases involving other
types of disputes (e.g., the recovery of money).

